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Abstract 
In this thesis, a new procedure is proposed which achieves the rapid induction of false 
recognition memory for rich pictorial stimuli. Chapter 2 presents the basic three-step 
procedure in which participants study some pictures, imagine others in response to words, 
and perform a picture recognition test. Imagining pictures leads to a false alarm rate of 27% 
above baseline (Experiments 1a and 1b). In Chapter 3, a source monitoring test is used to 
demonstrate that this effect is not solely due to diffuse familiarity (Experiment 2) and does 
not appear to be driven by perceptual processing (Experiment 3). Chapter 4 investigates 
whether imagination impairs discrimination between studied and new items presented side 
by side. On a two-alternative forced choice test, participants are less accurate in indicating 
the studied picture when it is paired with an imagined picture than when paired with a new 
picture (Experiment 4). The role of indirect tests in verbal false memory research and the 
value of applying them to pictorial stimuli is discussed in Chapter 5. An indirect perceptual 
identification test previously used for words is adapted to pictures and shown to be highly 
perceptually driven (Experiment 5). Chapter 6 presents consistent evidence for the lack of 
perceptual priming of imagined items in the current procedure despite high levels of false 
recognition (Experiments 6-7), again indicating that the effect is conceptually driven. 
Chapter 7 discusses how the new procedure presented in the thesis can further our 
understanding of the similarities and differences between true and false memories.   5 
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CHAPTER 1: FALSE MEMORY FOR VERBAL AND PICTORIAL STIMULI 
 
1.1 False Memory: An Introduction 
A feature of human memory is its susceptibility to distortions and illusions (Roediger, 
1996). In the past 15 years, this susceptibility has generated much research into what is 
broadly defined as “false memory,” although the use of this term has recently attracted 
some controversy (see DePrince, Allard, & Freyd, 2004; Pezdek & Lam, 2007; Wade et al., 
2007). For our purposes, it suffices to say that this term refers to situations in which a 
memory does not correspond to the reality of an experience. The most straightforward 
example of a mismatch between memory and reality is when a person remembers 
experiencing an event which did not occur.  Various methodologies have been used to 
study this phenomenon, ranging from elegant single-session experiments which elicit false 
recognition of prototypical dot patterns (Metcalfe and Fisher, 1986) and verbal stimuli (see 
Gallo, 2006 for a review), to long-term false memory inductions which lead participants to 
believe that they have experienced fictitious events (e.g., Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). 
 
1.2 False Memory for Verbal Stimuli: The DRM Paradigm 
The methodology most commonly used for studying memory errors for words is the 
Deese (1959) / Roediger and McDermott (1995) paradigm (known as the DRM paradigm) 
in which participants learn 15-word lists, each of which converges on one associate, the 
critical lure. For instance, the following list is based around the critical lure CHAIR: table, 
sit, legs, seat, couch, desk, recliner, sofa, wood, cushion, swivel, stool, sitting, rocking, 
bench. The lists used in this paradigm were simply designed by picking out the first 15   11 
associates of the critical lure from a set of word norms (Russell & Jenkins, 1954). At test, 
despite never having seen it in the study phase, subjects spontaneously produce the critical 
lure CHAIR in free recall and/or report having studied it on recognition tests. While the lists 
vary in terms of how effectively they induce participants to acquire a false memory for the 
nonpresented critical lure, levels of false recognition (72%) can be higher than average true 
recognition (65%). In order to calculate corrected true and false recognition rates, baseline 
false recognition rates for items from non-studied lists (list items and critical lures 
respectively) were subtracted from the above figures. False recognition of critical lures 
from non-studied lists was at 16%, producing a corrected false recognition rate of 56%; 
analogously, false recognition of list words from non-studied lists was 11%, producing a 
corrected true recognition rate of 54%. More evidence for the strength of this false memory 
is that the critical lure was spontaneously produced in a free recall test at rate of 55%, 
which came close to the 62% mean probability of recall of the studied words (Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995).  
 
1.3 False Memory for Autobiographical Events 
While this paradigm has generated a lot of research (see Gallo, 2006), it has often 
been criticised for its lack of ecological validity, and some authors have pointed out the 
dangers of extending conclusions from research with such derived stimuli to controversial 
real-world situations such as recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse (Freyd & 
Gleaves, 1996). At the other end of the spectrum are studies which have looked at false 
memories for autobiographical events. In Loftus and Pickrell‟s (1995) sample, 25% of 
participants came to falsely believe that they had got lost in a shopping mall at the age of   12 
five after a sequence of sessions spent trying to recall details from this event alongside 
details of events that had really taken place. Although this finding is striking and certainly 
highly applicable to everyday experience, the problem with this method is that recognition 
memory can never truly be tested. In experiments which use words and other derived 
stimuli, we can present the stimuli to participants and ask them whether a particular 
stimulus had been presented previously, whereas when studying autobiographical memory, 
we must rely on participants‟ introspective reports. Recognition is particularly important in 
the case of false memory because presentation of the stimulus itself at test allows 
participants to compare it directly to their memories of stimuli they had actually perceived, 
and to reject unstudied stimuli based on characteristics that appear novel. 
 
1.4 False Memory for Pictures 
Pictorial stimuli may be seen as offering a compromise between the ecological 
validity of autobiographical studies and the flexibility of verbal stimuli. However, there has 
been little research into false memory for pictorial stimuli, and when it has been conducted 
more often than not the stimuli have been line drawings (most commonly those developed 
by Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980). In studies looking into false memory for pictures, 
pictorial stimuli are either presented at encoding only, or both at encoding and at test. Of 
primary interest is the latter case, as such a procedure allows participants to compare the 
test stimulus directly to any existing memory trace and make a memory judgment on the 
stimulus itself.  
In the category associates procedure (Hintzman, 1988; Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997), 
participants study lists of pictures which correspond to certain categories (e.g., animals)   13 
and are later given a recognition test consisting of some items shown at study, some novel 
items from the same semantic categories as the studied pictures (e.g., other animals), and 
some novel items from unstudied categories (e.g., clothes). This procedure typically 
produces impressive rates of corrected false recognition, because participants show 
minimal false recognition for items from unstudied categories and much higher levels of 
false recognition for new exemplars from studied categories (e.g., corrected false 
recognition of up to 40%, Koutstaal, Verfaellie, & Schacter, 2001). As the number of 
studied items within a category increases, so does the level of false alarms to new members 
of those categories. In these studies, high levels of false recognition arise because 
participants misapply the knowledge that they have studied many pictures from one 
category and incorrectly assume that any pictures from that category have probably been 
studied. 
Israel and Schacter (1997) developed a version of the DRM paradigm in which each 
word was presented with an accompanying line drawing at study and/or at test. Studying 
and being tested on pictures lead to much lower levels of false recognition (corrected false 
recognition of 23%) than typically found on the standard word task. Finally, Fazendeiro, 
Winkielman, Luo, and Lorah (2005, Experiment 1B) used a similar but less powerful false 
memory induction procedure in which just one studied item was paired with a semantically 
related lure that was later presented at test along with studied items and unrelated lures, 
which produced a corrected false recognition rate of just 8% . 
 
1.5 Picture Superiority and Distinctiveness   14 
The finding that old and new pictures are easier to tell apart than old and new words 
is well-documented (Shepard, 1967). Various accounts have been proposed to explain this 
picture superiority effect. In his dual-coding theory, Paivio proposed that words and 
pictures are represented by individual codes and that the image code might be inherently 
stronger than the verbal code. Alternatively, Paivio suggested there could be cross-talk 
between these two distinct codes, but that the verbal code is triggered more easily by a 
picture rather than vice versa. So studying a picture might result in a memory of a picture 
plus an associated word generated internally, more often than studying a word would result 
in the memory of this word being accompanied by an internally generated image.  
Another set of explanations does not call for two separate codes, instead attributing 
the picture superiority effect to the inherent distinctiveness of pictorial when compared to 
verbal representations. Pictures are more heterogeneous than words in terms of perceptual 
features, and thus have more distinctive features, which may facilitate the creation of 
unique memory traces (Nelson, Reed & McEvoy, 1977). In a similar vein, Nelson, Reed 
and Walling (1976) designed a set of line drawings that were so perceptually similar that 
they were no longer recognised with any more accuracy than words. The distinctiveness 
could also arise from conceptual processes, as pictures may offer more direct access to 
meaning than words, for instance by facilitating semantic tasks such as categorisation 
(Potter and Faulconer, 1975). The distinctiveness explanation has been applied to false 
memory research, although the focus has been on studies in which word/picture format is 
manipulated only at encoding and memory is tested with verbal cues. The idea behind the 
distinctiveness heuristic (Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 1999; Hege & Dodson, 2004) is that,   15 
having encoded items in a more distinctive format, participants search their memory for 
associated detail, and the absence of this detail can help them make a correct rejection.  
The role of distinctiveness in picture recognition tests where study/test formats are 
matched is even more intuitive: in the case of studied items, the more distinctive features a 
picture has, the more likely it is that one of these features would have been encoded and 
can serve as a recognition cue (Loftus & Bell, 1975); while in the case of new items, the 
more distinctive details there are, the more likely it is that the novelty of one such detail 
will alert the participant to the fact that they had not seen the item before. Loftus and Bell 
compared recognition performance for black and white photographs and line drawings at 
exposure durations from 50 to 500 msec. Participants showed higher sensitivity to 
photographs compared to drawings at every exposure duration. Part of this effect was 
attributed to the increased likelihood of encoding an informative detail for a photograph 
than for a line drawing. However, the improved memory performance for photographs 
persisted even when participants claimed to be making the recognition response based on 
familiarity, implying that photographs are inherently more distinguishable than line 
drawings.  
 
1.6 Monitoring and Misattribution 
The most widely accepted explanation of the false memory phenomenon in the DRM 
paradigm involves a two-step process. First, the critical lure is activated by its semantic 
associates, i.e., the list of words that are related to this lure. This activation can occur both 
at encoding, when associates are actually studied, and at retrieval. Then, at test, a decision 
has to be made as to the source of this activation: the participant must decide whether they   16 
thought of this word themselves, or whether it had actually appeared in the list, a process 
described by Johnson, Hashtroudi, and Lindsay (1993) as reality monitoring. The 
activation/monitoring account explains false memory in the DRM paradigm as a 
combination of semantic activation and faulty reality monitoring which causes subjects to 
incorrectly attribute the activation to prior perception (Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & 
Gallo, 2001). 
In fact, errors of misattribution are a very important concept in false memory. When 
people engage in reality monitoring, they rely on metacognitive cues to decide whether a 
memory is of an internally generated or an externally experienced event. Sometimes, these 
cues will be helpful and will generally lead to the correct decision. For instance, memories 
of externally experienced events tend to be richer in perceptual detail than internally 
generated content (Johnson, Suengas, Foley, & Raye, 1988); the latter, on the other hand, 
are commonly remembered together with related cognitive operations (Finke, Johnson, & 
Shyi, 1988; Schooler, Gerhard, & Loftus, 1986). Similarly, when trying to distinguish 
between true and false memories, participants may rely on the knowledge that they tend to 
recall more distinctive, item-specific perceptual details for true than false memories 
(Norman & Schacter, 1997). Other such cues can be misleading. A classic example is the 
fluency heuristic: if some material is processed more fluently than other material on a test, 
or simply more fluently than expected, this material evokes a feeling of familiarity and this 
familiarity is then interpreted as arising from prior study (Johnston, Dark, & Jacoby, 1985). 
However, this may not always be a correct inference: fluency can be affected by a variety 
of factors other than prior study. In the verbal domain, for instance, perceptual clarity   17 
(Whittlesea, Jacoby, & Girard, 1990) and meaningful semantic context (Whittlesea, 1993) 
can make words easier to process and hence appear more familiar.  
Fazendeiro et al. (2005; Experiment 3) demonstrated that misattributed fluency can 
contribute to false recognition even when formats are not matched between study and test.  
Participants studied a mixed list of line drawings and words, and were tested on studied 
items, semantically related items, and new items. Studied items appeared in the same 
format (word or line drawing) as at study, while related items were presented in the 
opposite format. So, for instance, the word chair may have been presented in the study 
phase, and a picture of a table at test. Corrected false recognition was .13 for pictures 
whose semantic associates had been presented as words in the study phase. As with the 
DRM paradigm, this result could be explained in terms of activation followed by faulty 
monitoring, with the caveat that any such activation must be exclusively conceptual. The 
current procedure makes use of the transfer of conceptual fluency across presentation 
format and induces false recognition of pictures by presenting participants with the names 
of the objects depicted in those pictures. 
 
1.7 False Memory for Pictures: A New Procedure 
Above we reviewed evidence that people do better in memory tests when the stimuli 
are more visually complex, be it pictures as opposed to words, or highly differentiated line 
drawings as opposed to ones that are similarly structured. It is perhaps because of this 
picture superiority phenomenon that researchers have tended to shy away from false 
memory procedures where pictures are presented both at study and at test. The first goal of 
this thesis was thus to develop a false memory induction using distinctive photographs,   18 
without relying on long delays between study and test or driving down correct recognition 
of studied items. In order to achieve this, the current experiments involve a three-step 
procedure based on misinformation (Loftus, 1975) and imagination inflation (Johnson, 
Raye, Foley, & Kim, 1982) studies. Chapter 2 provides a description of how these and 
other false memory experiments inspired the design of the current procedure, and describes 
two versions (Experiments 1a and 1b) which demonstrate its success in inducing high 
levels of false recognition of distinctive photographs.  
The first two experiments employed variations on the standard old/new recognition 
test. It was important to make sure that false recognition was not attributable to factors 
other than a genuine memory of having perceived the picture. In order to verify this, the 
testing procedure was modified to make it more sensitive, first using a source monitoring 
test (Chapter 3, Experiments 2 and 3) and then a two-alternative forced choice test (Chapter 
4, Experiment 4). Although these tests were more conservative, they produced significant 
levels of false recognition which were hard to explain without invoking the existence of a 
genuine false memory for the unstudied pictures. 
 
1.8 False Memory on Indirect Tests 
Another way of testing memory is through indirect or implicit tests, whereby prior 
exposure to test stimuli facilitates performance on tasks including lexical decision (Ratcliff, 
Hockley, & McKoon, 1985) and picture naming (Warren & Morton, 1982). Recently, 
researchers have investigated whether false memory for critical lures in the DRM paradigm 
is exhibited on indirect as well as direct memory tests. Indirect tests can be roughly divided 
into those that tap into the perceptual and those that tap into the conceptual details of   19 
studied stimuli (Weldon, Roediger, Beitel, & Johnston, 1995). Perceptual indirect tests such 
as speeded recognition of degraded stimuli rely on the identification of perceptual features, 
while conceptual indirect tests such as word association access an item‟s meaning. It has 
generally been found that performance on conceptual indirect tests is facilitated for critical 
lures as well as for studied items (e.g., McDermott, 1997), while the behaviour of critical 
lures on perceptual indirect tests is more controversial (e.g., Hicks & Starns, 2005; 
McBride, Coane, & Raulerson, 2006); these findings are reviewed in Chapter 5. So far, no 
work has been done on false memory for pictorial stimuli using indirect memory tests. In 
Chapter 6 (Experiments 5–7), the indirect test methodology is applied to pictures in order 
to investigate whether false memory for pictures in the new procedure presented in Chapter 
2 is driven by perceptual processes. 
 
1.9 Perceptual Processes in False Recognition of Pictures 
As well as developing a new procedure that produces high levels of false recognition 
of pictures at short delay, another aim of this thesis is to specify the nature of the 
representations underlying the false memories created with the new experimental 
procedure. An important question is whether false memories can possess similar perceptual 
attributes to true memories. Attempts have been made to answer this question by examining 
participants‟ introspections regarding the perceptual qualities of true and false memories, 
either with verbal reports (e.g., Lampinen, Odergard, & Bullington, 2003; Heaps & Nash, 
2001; Norman and Schacter, 1997; Schooler et al., 1986) or rating scales (e.g., Mather, 
Henkel, & Johnson, 1997; Johnson et al., 1988). Although the results have been mixed, the 
phenomenological differences between true and false memories appear to be quite subtle.   20 
One suggested explanation for the blurred distinction between true and false memories is 
that false memories may acquire perceptual details by borrowing them from true memories 
(e.g., Lampinen, Meier, Arnal, & Leding, 2005). However, false memories do not need to 
be perceptually based. A false memory might arise when an internally generated perceptual 
representation is mistaken for a memory of perceiving the item, but it could also arise from 
nonperceptual activation. This question is addressed throughout the thesis (in particular in 
Experiments 3 and 5-7), and various techniques are used to determine whether the false 
memories reported by participants in the current procedure are conceptually or perceptually 
based.   21 
CHAPTER 2: FALSE MEMORY FOR PICTURES: A NEW PROCEDURE 
 
One process that has been found to contribute significantly to the formation of false 
memories is that of imagination. While the benefits of imagination to memory 
enhancement are well known (e.g., Marschark & Surian, 1989), imagination has also been 
used as a tool to induce false memories of actions (Anderson, 1984; Goff & Roediger, 
1998), auditory and visual events (Henkel, Franklin, & Johnson, 2000), autobiographical 
memories (Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996; Hyman, Husband, & Billing, 1995; 
Hyman & Pentland, 1996), words (Johnson, Raye, Wang, & Taylor, 1979), pictures of 
visual scenes (Intraub & Hoffman, 1992), and pictures  of objects (Henkel & Franklin, 
1998; Johnson et al, 1979).  
According to the source monitoring framework, imagined and perceived events differ 
in terms of their memory characteristics, and these characteristics are useful when people 
are trying to tell the two apart (Johnson & Raye, 1981). For instance, memories of 
perceived events are thought to be rich in sensory detail (e.g., Stern & Rotello, 2000), so 
when deciding whether an event had been perceived or imagined, people might set a 
criterion for the level of sensory detail recalled. However, there are strong suggestions from 
neuroimaging work that imagination and perception overlap both in terms of function 
(Kosslyn & Thompson, 2000) and structure (Borst & Kosslyn, 2008), and there is some 
evidence that false alarms are predicted by activation of brain regions linked to vivid 
imagination (Gonsalves and Paller, 2000; Gonsalves, Reber, Gitelman, Parrish, et al., 
2004). More specifically, Gonsalves and colleagues postulate that the likelihood of an 
imagined event being misattributed to perception depends on the vividness of the imagery.   22 
If imagination can produce activation that is similar in nature to that resulting from 
perception, that would make it very difficult to differentiate between perceived and 
imagined events. In the current procedure, imagination inflation is used in an attempt to 
create an internal event that can be mistaken for a true memory. 
A method of inducing false memory made popular by Loftus (1975) involves the 
insertion of misleading information between study and test. Loftus, Miller, and Burns 
(1978) showed participants a set of slides depicting an event and later asked participants to 
choose the correct slide from pairs in which one slide was identical to the original and the 
other was slightly altered. In between the study and test phases, participants were either 
given verbal information consistent with the original slides, or consistent with the lure 
slides. In the latter condition, participants were more likely to choose the lure slide than the 
slide they had actually seen. This effect appears to be striking, but is undermined by the 
fact that the two pictures in each pair were identical apart from the one detail referred to in 
the misleading information. Okado and Stark (2005) used a similar three-step procedure to 
inflate false memory for pictures. In the study phase, participants were presented with some 
object names accompanied by a picture and imagined other objects, while at test they were 
presented with the names of studied, imagined and new pictures and asked to indicate 
which ones had been presented with a picture. In order to inflate the number of false alarms 
made on imagined trials, in an intervening phase participants were presented with some of 
the object names from the study phase and encouraged to lie about having seen pictures 
they had only imagined. In a pilot test, this manipulation lead to an increase from 13% to 
17% of false endorsements of imagined items as having been studied.    23 
In the current procedure, a three-phase design is combined with the categorised list 
structure of the category associates procedure described in Chapter 1 in an attempt to elicit 
high levels of false recognition of imagined pictures. In the study phase, participants label 
pictures (black and white or colour photographs) of objects that belong to one of five 
categories and at test are presented with pictures and asked to indicate which ones had 
appeared in the study phase. The false memory induction occurs in an intervening phase 
where participants are presented with the names of the studied objects, with a small 
proportion of items replaced with names of objects that had not appeared in pictorial form 
in the study phase but belong to the same five semantic categories. Participants are not 
informed of this manipulation; the instructions for this phase require them to recall whether 
the object had appeared in black and white or in colour in the study phase. In the absence of 
such a memory (i.e., for those objects names that refer to non-presented pictures, although 
this is not made explicit), participants are asked to imagine the picture and answer the 
question based on this image. In the test phase, participants are presented with studied 
pictures, imagined pictures, and new pictures, all of which belonged to the same five 
semantic categories. Experiments 1a and 1b demonstrate that this imagery manipulation – 
asking people to imagine an object in order to make a recollective judgment about a picture 
they had never seen – is very successful in eliciting high levels of false recognition. 
 
2.1 Experiment 1a 
The test phase of this experiment consisted of an old/new recognition test with 
remember/know judgments. The distinction between remembering and knowing was first 
used experimentally by Tulving (1985) to tap into the subjective difference between   24 
memories that feel like facts (noetic memory, associated with know responses) and 
memories that can be re-experienced by the process of mental time travel (autonoetic 
memory, associated with remember responses). False alarms are more frequently made 
with know responses, with some exceptions (e.g., in the DRM paradigm, Roediger and 
McDermott, 1995). In the current procedure, the distribution of remember/know responses 
was compared for two types of false alarms: false alarms to new items and false alarms to 
previously imagined items.  
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four participants (8 males) aged 18 to 30 (M = 20.0) took part in the 
experiment. Participants were volunteers recruited within University College London and 
reimbursed for their time.  
Materials 
The stimuli in the experiment consisted of 110 categorised pictures normed for name 
agreement, and 24 additional pictures used as filler items. For the corpus of 110 categorised 
pictures, lists of 22 items were constructed for the following five categories: animals, 
clothes, electrical appliances, fruit and vegetables, and household objects (see Appendix A 
for full list of items). The selection of items in each list was based as far as possible on 
semantic category norms (Van Overschelde, Rawson, & Dunlosky, 2004), but constrained 
to some extent by availability of appropriate pictorial stimuli. In order to achieve the 
required list length, Van Overschelde et al.‟s “fruit” and “vegetable” categories were 
merged to form one list, while “kitchen utensils” and “carpenter‟s tools” were combined to 
create the household objects list, and additionally a list of electrical appliances was   25 
compiled. There was no overlap between categories, so, for instance, none of the household 
objects could be powered by electricity. An additional 24 pictures were used as fillers in the 
practice task prior to the study phase (14 furniture items), and as fillers in the test phase (5 
musical instruments and 5 food products).  
Based on the semantic category norms, six critical items were chosen from each of 
the four categories for which norms were available. Each item was one of the top seven 
most popular items in each category. For the new category of electrical appliances, norms 
were produced by asking 20 people to list six exemplars; the six most popular exemplars 
were used as critical items for the electrical appliances category. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Sample stimuli used in all experiments. The left panel shows a full colour 
picture while the right panel shows another picture converted to black and white format. 
 
The stimuli were full-colour photographs edited in Adobe Photoshop. Items were 
presented on a 300 x 300 pixel white background with shadows and extraneous detail such 
   26 
as text removed (see Figure 2.1 for sample stimuli). Black and white versions of the 
pictures were produced using the Grayscale function. In order to obtain agreed labels for 
the pictures, four people were asked to name a larger pool of pictures, half of which 
appeared in colour and half in black and white; this was counterbalanced between 
participants. The final set of 110 categorised pictures included only those which elicited the 
same response from at least three of the four participants. The study, imagery and test 
phases of the experiment were programmed in Visual Basic 6.0 and a PC with screen 
resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels was used to run the experiment. 
Design 
The experiment used a repeated measures design, with item type 
(seen/imagined/new) as the within-subjects variable. Of the 110 categorised pictures, a total 
of 30 were critical items (six from each of the five categories; see italicised items in 
Appendix A). There were three groups of critical items: 10 seen items, 10 imagined items, 
and 10 new items. Seen items were those that were presented to participants as pictures 
during the study phase and as labels in the imagery phase; imagined items were those that 
appeared only as incorrect options in the study phase labelling task and once again as labels 
in the imagery phase; and new items did not appear in either phase. The three sets of 10 
critical items (two from each of the five categories in each set) were rotated between the 
seen, imagined and new conditions giving three counterbalancing conditions. Apart from 
the critical items, participants in all conditions also studied the remaining 80 non-critical 
items, i.e., 16 pictures each from the animals, clothes, electrical appliances, fruit and 
vegetables, and household objects categories. In each of these conditions, half the items 
appeared in colour and half in black and white in the study and test phases. A further three   27 
conditions were created to counterbalance this, producing six counterbalancing conditions 
in total. 
Procedure 
The experiment was completed in one 30-minute session and involved a study phase 
in which participants labelled a set of pictures, an imagery phase where participants tried to 
recall whether the pictures they had seen in the study phase had been presented in black and 
white or in colour, and a recognition test phase. 
Study Phase. In this phase, participants were shown a total of 90 pictures, made up of 
80 non-critical items common to all conditions and 10 pictures from the critical items list 
(these are referred to as seen pictures at test). Their task was to choose the correct word for 
each picture from a choice of two. The two words appeared on the screen first for 4000 
msec, one either side of the screen. During this time participants were asked to imagine 
pictures for each of these words. They were not given any specific instructions for this 
imagery task (e.g., whether to imagine the pictures in black and white or colour). Next, a 
picture corresponding to one of the words appeared in the centre of the screen for 250 msec 
and the words disappeared. Following this brief presentation, participants had to make a 
choice by pressing either the \ key to select the left word or the / key to select the right 
word. As a reminder, these symbols appeared in place of the words when it was time to 
make a choice. As soon as participants made their selection, a low-pitched beep sounded in 
the case of an incorrect response, and the next trial began immediately. 
The word corresponding to the picture appeared as one of the choices on each trial. 
The alternative word corresponded to a different picture from the same category. For 
example, participants may have been shown the words cat and dog followed by a picture of   28 
a dog. Out of the 18 trials of each category, on 12 trials the incorrect word corresponded to 
another picture participants would see during the experiment. For the other six trials in each 
category, incorrect words corresponded to the two critical imagined items which 
participants would not see in the study phase. The order of trials was randomised across all 
categories, and word pairs were chosen at random by the program with the above 
constraints. 
Participants read instructions on screen and completed a practice block of 14 items, 
after which they were told their score and the real experiment began. Of the 90 pictures 
shown to participants, 45 appeared in colour and 45 in black and white, but there was 
nothing in the instructions relating to this. There was also no mention of a memory test and 
participants were not asked explicitly to try to memorise the pictures or anything about 
them. 
Imagery Phase. Following a 5-minute mental arithmetic distractor task, participants 
were shown 90 words and asked to indicate whether they had seen the picture 
corresponding to this word in black and white or in colour during the first part of the 
experiment. This task was used in order to encourage participants to create and examine a 
mental image of the picture. Each word appeared for 4000 msec in the centre of the screen, 
during which time participants were asked to form a mental image of the corresponding 
picture in order to answer the question. Once the word disappeared, choices were made 
using the same keys as in the study phase. Participants were asked to use the number 
keypad to rate how confident they were in their answer following each response on a scale 
of 1 to 5 where 1 = not at all confident and 5 = extremely confident.   29 
The words that appeared in this phase referred to 70 of the 80 pictures seen by all 
participants in the study phase (the same 10 pictures were excluded for all participants), 
and the items that later appeared as seen items (10 words) and imagined items (10 words) 
in the test phase. Eighty of the words thus corresponded to 80 of the pictures seen by 
participants in the study phase, while the other 10 had not previously been encountered as 
pictures. The instructions stated that the words in this phase corresponded to pictures seen 
in the previous part of the experiment. In other words, participants were not informed that 
some of the words had not actually appeared as pictures. However, they were instructed to 
try to form mental images for any words they could not remember having seen as pictures 
in the study phase and make their choices based on these mental images in the absence of a 
memory. The format of this phase was similar to that of the study phase, with instructions 
appearing on screen. There was no practice block and no feedback in response to 
participants‟ answers. 
Test Phase. All participants, regardless of counterbalancing condition, were tested on 
the same 40 items. Ten of these were filler items from novel categories, and the other 30 
were critical items: 10 seen items, 10 imagined items and 10 new items. Of the 40 pictures, 
participants had therefore only actually seen 10 during the study phase. Pictures were 
presented in the same central location as during the study phase. Seen pictures appeared in 
the same colour format as in the study phase, while new pictures appeared in black and 
white or colour according to counterbalancing condition, so that half of the items seen at 
test were in black and white and half were in colour. Participants were shown the 40 
pictures one by one and asked to judge whether they were old (i.e., whether participants 
had seen them in the study phase) or new using the same two keys they had used in the   30 
study and imagery phases. Instructions appeared on screen as in the other phases. 
Participants made old/new judgments in their own time while viewing the picture. If 
participants identified a picture as old, the picture remained on screen and they were asked 
to make a remember/know judgment. Participants were asked to press R if they had a 
conscious recollection of the item's occurrence during the first stage, or of what they were 
thinking about at the time it was presented, and to press K if they were sure that the item 
was presented in the study phase, but were unable to consciously recollect its actual 
appearance or any other details regarding its occurrence in the study phase. Following a 
new or remember/know judgment, the next trial began immediately. There was no practice 
phase for this test. 
Results 
Study Phase 
Performance in the study phase ranged from 93.3% to 100% correct identification of 
pictures from a choice of two labels, with a mean score of 97.8%. Over half the participants 
made less than three identification errors in the 90 trials, and no-one made more than eight 
errors.  
Imagery Phase 
Performance in the imagery phase was based on the 80 items which had appeared in 
the study phase. All participants performed above chance in this task, in which they had to 
indicate whether they had seen each corresponding picture in black and white or colour in 
the study phase. Scores ranged from 53.8% to 81.3%, with a mean score of 64.6% (SD = 
7.0), which was significantly different from the chance level of 50%, t(23) = 10.11, p < 
.001. On the 1 to 5 confidence scale, participants were significantly more confident on their   31 
answers to seen items (M = 3.43) than to imagined items (M = 2.10); t(23) = 8.40, SEM = 
.16, r = .74, p < .001. 
Test Phase 
The left panel of Figure 2.2 shows the proportion of old responses to the three item 
types (seen, imagined, and new) by colour format (black and white or colour). Participants 
responded almost identically to colour and black and white pictures (F < 1), so this factor 
was left out of all further analyses. The responses shown in Figure 2.2 represent hits for 
seen items and false alarms for imagined and new items.  
.00
.20
.40
.60
.80
1.00
Seen Imagined New
Item Type
P
r
o
p
o
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
O
l
d
 
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
s Colour
Black and white
.00
.20
.40
.60
.80
1.00
Seen Imagined New
Item Type
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
R
e
m
e
m
b
e
r
 
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
s
 
Figure 2.2: Left panel: Proportion of old responses to seen, imagined, and new items by 
colour format in Experiment 1a. Right panel: Proportion of remember responses to seen, 
imagined, and new items across colour formats in Experiment 1a. Error bars represent 
SEM in this and all subsequent figures. 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA showed that there was a significant effect of item type, 
F(1.61, 37.0) = 209.72, MSE = .02, partial ŋ
2 = .90, p < .001 (Mauchly‟s test indicated that   32 
the assumption of sphericity had been violated: χ²(2) = 6.14, p < .05; a Greenhouse-Geisser 
estimate of sphericity was used to correct degrees of freedom, ε = .80). The likelihood of 
participants responding old to an item was therefore dependent upon its status. The 
proportion of hits to pictures which had appeared in the study phase (M = .79) as well as 
false alarms to pictures which had appeared as words in the imagery phase (M = .27) were 
both significantly higher than the proportion of false alarms to new pictures (M = .05; t(23) 
= 26.86, SEM = .03, r = .96, p < .001 and t(23) = 5.72, SEM = .04, r = .59, p < .001 
respectively), and 21/24 participants showed the latter effect (i.e., the number of false 
alarms they made to imagined items was at least one item higher than the number of false 
alarms they made to new items). The right panel of Figure 2.2 shows the proportion of 
remember responses by item type. Remember responses were made on 64% of hits to seen 
items (.50 of all seen trials) and on 29% of false alarms to imagined items (.08 of all 
imagined trials). Half of the participants made at least one remember false alarm on an 
imagined trial, whereas every false alarm to every new item across all participants was 
accompanied by a know response. 
In this and all subsequent experiments, baseline estimates of bias are presented for 
seen versus new items. The bias results are summarised in Appendix B. C was calculated 
from hits and false alarm rates; to accommodate hit rates of 1 and false alarm rates of 0, 0.5 
was added to each datapoint, which was then divided by N + 1, where N is the number of 
trials of that type (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). Given that one item type would have had to 
be kept constant between pairs, there was no additional value in comparing bias between 
any two pairs of items. Instead, the baseline bias estimate was compared to zero in all 
cases, and between conditions where there was more than one. In the current experiment,   33 
participants responded with a mean criterion of .37 which was significantly stricter than 
zero, t(23) = 4.76, p < .001. 
Discussion 
Experiment 1a successfully implemented a new procedure which elicited high levels 
of false memory for rich pictorial stimuli with a false memory induction involving 
imagination: imagining pictures led to an increase of .22 in false alarms compared to new 
items. These false alarms were sometimes accompanied by feelings of recollection relating 
to the encoding event: almost a third of the imagined item false alarms as compared with 
none of the new item false alarms were made with a remember response. The high hit rate 
and low new item false alarm rate indicates that participants had no problem distinguishing 
between items they previously studied and new items from the same category. The elevated 
false recognition rate for the imagined items was thus specifically related to studying the 
object‟s name and/or imagining the pictorial representation of this object. 
Performance did not differ for colour compared to black and white pictures. Although 
the black and white/colour manipulation was only included in order to provide a memory 
task for the imagery phase, it also served as a useful test of the effects of colour information 
on memory. There was no difference in the way participants responded to colour and black 
and white stimuli in the present experiment. While some studies have shown that colour 
can be used to enhance memory for pictures (Bousfield, Esterson, & Whitmarsh, 1957; 
Suzuki and Takahashi, 1997), others have found no improvement in memory from the 
inclusion of colour information (Paivio, Rogers, and Smythe, 1968), and the results 
reported here support the latter finding. Note that the experiments presented here were not 
designed to explicitly test any hypotheses relating to stimulus distinctiveness and its effects   34 
on false memory; rather, detailed and varied pictorial stimuli were used in all experiments 
as a response to the findings already documented in the literature and reviewed in Chapter 
1 regarding these effects.  
 
2.2 Experiment 1b 
Experiment 1a allowed participants only three response options (remember, know, 
and new). In the current experiment, a more sensitive recognition test was employed. 
Instead of making old/new and remember/know judgments, participants responded to each 
item on a 6-point confidence scale. This allowed the construction of ROC curves and 
established that false alarm rates to imagined and new items differed across all confidence 
levels. 
Method 
  Participants 
Thirty-six participants (20 males) aged 18 to 40 (M = 25.7) took part in the 
experiment. Participants were reimbursed for their time. 
  Procedure 
The procedure of this experiment was identical to that of Experiment 1a except for 
response options in the test phase. Recognition judgments were made on a confidence scale 
from 1 to 6 where 1 = very sure new and 6 = very sure old to allow the construction of 
empirical ROC curves.  
Results 
Study and Imagery Phases    35 
In the study phase, participants identified pictures from a choice of two words with a 
mean correct score of 97.2%. Performance in the imagery phase, where participants 
reported the colour format of pictures seen in the study phase, ranged from 55.3% to 
81.3%, with a mean score of 65.0% (SD = 6.9), which was significantly above the chance 
level of 50%, t(35) = 13.11, p < .001. As in Experiment 1a, in the imagery phase 
participants were significantly more confident on the 5-point scale in their answers to the 
80 pictures from the study phase (M = 3.54) than to the 10 novel items (M = 2.48), t(35) = 
9.66, SEM = .11, r = .52, p < .001. There was no difference in performance on these 
measures between Experiments 1a and 1b. 
Test Phase 
Initially, responses given on the 6-point scale were collapsed into old responses 
(items given a rating of 4–6) and new responses (ratings of 1–3). The left panel of Figure 
2.3 shows the proportion of old responses to each item type. A repeated measures ANOVA 
showed that there was a significant effect of item type, F(2, 70) = 170.40, MSE = .03, 
partial ŋ
2 =.83,  p < .001. The likelihood of participants responding old to an item was 
therefore dependent upon its status. Planned paired-samples t-tests showed a significant 
difference in old responses to seen items (M = .78) when compared to new items (M = .06; 
t(35) = 20.64, SEM = .04, r = .93, = p < .001) and also imagined items (M = .37) compared 
to new items, t(35) = 7.05, SEM = .04, r = .62, p < .001; participants made significantly 
more false alarms to imagined items than to new items, and 30 of the 36 participants 
showed this effect (i.e., they made at least one more false alarm to imagined items 
compared with new items).    36 
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Figure 2.3: Left panel: Proportion of old responses to seen, imagined, and new items in 
Experiment 1b. Right panel: Proportion of very sure old responses to seen, imagined, and 
new items in Experiment 1b. 
 
The right panel of Figure 2.3 shows the proportion of high confidence (confidence 
level 6, very sure old) responses by item type. The same pattern of data emerged when 
these responses were analysed separately: a repeated-measures ANOVA showed a 
significant effect of item type, F(1.67, 58.6) = 89.41, MSE = .03, partial ŋ
2 =.72,  p < .001 
(Mauchly‟s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated: χ²(2) = 7.3, p 
< .05; a Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of sphericity was used to correct degrees of freedom, 
ε = .84). Even at a high confidence level, false alarms to imagined items were made at a 
mean rate of .09, which was significantly higher than the false alarm rate of .01 to new 
items, t(35) = 2.84; SEM = .03, r = .30, p < .01; only two participants made any high 
confidence false alarms to new items, while 15 of the 36 participants made high confidence 
false alarms to imagined items. High confidence hits were made at a rate of .48; the high   37 
confidence responses thus replicated the pattern obtained for remember responses in 
Experiment 1a. In fact, a post-hoc cross-experimental comparison indicated that the 
criterion set for high confidence responses in the seen-new comparison was .98, almost 
exactly the same as the criterion for responding remember in Experiment 1a (.97; p > .9). 
Due to the low number of false alarms to new items, average confidence of old 
responses was compared between the seen and imagined conditions only for those 17 
participants who made at least 4 old responses in each of the two categories. A within-
subjects ANOVA confirmed that hits to seen items were made with higher confidence than 
false alarms to imagined tems (M = 5.46 and M = 4.80 respectively; F(1, 16) = 46.21, MSE 
= .08, partial ŋ
2 = .74, p < .001). The confidence ratings collected in this experiment 
permitted ROC curves to be plotted for the seen-imagined and seen-new comparisons. 
ROC curves are shown in Figure 2.4 and were constructed by plotting the cumulative hit 
and false alarm rates at each confidence level, starting at confidence level 6. It is clear from 
Figure 2.4 that the points from the two comparisons fall on different curves. As in 
Experiment 1a, the criterion in the seen-new comparison, (M = .30; see Appendix B), was 
significantly stricter than zero, t(35) = 4.44, p < .001
1. 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
FAs
H
i
t
s
seen-new
seen-imagined
 
Figure 2.4: ROC curves for seen-new and seen-imagined comparisons in Experiment 1b.   38 
 
Discussion 
This experiment replicated and extended the effect presented in Experiment 1a. The 
current version of the procedure produced even higher corrected false recognition rates than 
the first. One explanation for this is that the effort of making an additional 
(remember/know) judgment following an old response may have encouraged participants to 
be more conservative on trials where they were not confident that they had seen the item, 
whereas in the current experiment equal effort was associated with responding old and new. 
Tentative evidence for this explanation is the numerical decrease in bias from Experiment 
1a to 1b, although in a between-experiment comparison this difference did not reach 
significance. 
 In the current experiment, participants made more false alarms to imagined than new 
items at every confidence level. In fact, there were more false alarms to imagined items at 
the highest confidence level (very sure old, M = .09) than there were false alarms to new 
items at any confidence level (very sure old, sure old, and guess old, M = .06). Participants 
are thus clearly differentiating between imagined and new items on the test despite being 
asked whether they had seen the picture itself, and in some cases are very confident that 
they had previously studied a picture they had only imagined. 
 
2.3 Discussion of Experiments 1a and 1b 
Experiments 1a and 1b demonstrated a new procedure which produced corrected 
false recognition rates of up to 30% (Experiment 1b) for rich pictorial stimuli presented 
only 15 minutes earlier. Unlike most previous studies looking into false recognition at short   39 
delays (e.g., Israel & Schacter, 1997), the current procedure uses rich pictorial stimuli and 
always presents the pictures themselves as retrieval cues. The distinctiveness of the pictures 
should have aided participants in rejecting unseen stimuli, and yet the reported false 
recognition was higher than that in Israel and Schacter‟s pictorial version of the DRM 
paradigm. False recognition of imagined items was not quite as high as false recognition of 
pictures from studied categories reported in some versions of the category associates 
procedure (e.g., Koutstaal, Verfaellie, & Schacter, 2001). This is unsurprising given that in 
the category associates procedure, if participants relied only on their memory for which 
categories they had studied, they would automatically endorse any pictures from studied 
categories as old. In the current procedure, on the other hand, such a strategy would have 
increased not only false alarms to imagined items, but also false alarms to new items as 
both types of items were members of studied categories. On the contrary, the level of false 
recognition of new items in Experiments 1a and 1b was no higher than the false recognition 
rate typically obtained for items from unrelated categories in the category associates 
procedure. According to the fuzzy trace theory (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995), false alarms to 
new items from previously studied categories are made when participants are very reliant 
on gist information, whereas correct recognition would require a focus on item-specific 
information. In the present procedure, participants are clearly paying considerable attention 
to such information, which allows them to identify studied pictures and reject new pictures 
from studied categories with great accuracy.  
One criticism of these experiments is that, in the recognition test, participants could 
simply be responding old to pictures when they are aware that they had only studied the 
associated word, either because they are misunderstanding the instructions or because they   40 
are relying on familiarity and endorsing any familiar item as old. A source-monitoring test 
(Johnson et al., 1993) would give participants the option to indicate that they had 
previously only imagined a picture (or encountered it in word form) and not studied the 
picture itself. Given this additional response option, if false alarms to imagined items were 
only made in Experiments 1a and 1b due to familiarity processes or misunderstanding of 
instruction, we would expect no more imagined than new pictures to be incorrectly 
classified as having been studied. Chapter 3 explores this possibility.   41 
CHAPTER 3: FALSE MEMORY FOR PICTURES  
ON A SOURCE MONITORING TEST 
 
Henkel and Franklin (1998) investigated imagination inflation with a source 
monitoring test. In their experiments, participants were shown drawings of various objects, 
and asked to imagine other objects. At test, participants were prompted with object labels 
and asked whether they had perceived or imagined the associated object; in other words, 
they were asked to identify the source of their memory for this item. One way in which 
participants might perform this task is by imagining (or re-imagining) a picture of the 
object represented by the label, and then comparing this picture to any existing memory of 
the item. It is not too hard to see how in this situation participants might have trouble 
identifying whether the memory is of a self-generated image or a previously presented 
picture. Indeed, Henkel and Franklin found that increasing the number of perceived objects 
that were similar to an imagined object made participants more likely to incorrectly identify 
the imagined object as having been perceived. 
In Johnson et al.‟s (1993) source monitoring framework, the first stage of source 
attribution is to decide whether a memory is of an internally generated event or an event 
perceptually experienced in the outside world. Various aspects of the memory might help to 
distinguish between these two categories – for instance, one might examine the vividness of 
the image. Incorrect source attribution in the case of an imagined picture could thus result 
from the incorrect use of a heuristic which attributes a vivid mental image to prior 
perception. Source monitoring failure can be seen to play out in real life situations, for 
instance in the mugshot exposure effect where eyewitnesses mistakenly pick an innocent   42 
member of a line-up because they recognise them from a mugshot rather than the original 
event (see Deffenbacher, Bornstein, & Penrod (2006) for review), and in autobiographical 
memory, for example as shown in a study by Garry et al., (1996) where imagining 
childhood events lead to participants being more likely to claim they had occurred. 
In Experiments 1a and 1b, participants were forced to classify all pictures as either 
old or new, and had no way of indicating that the item had been encountered verbally but 
not pictorially. There could be at least two reasons why participants may choose the old 
response for imagined items despite having no memory of the picture itself. Firstly, they 
may assume that any item that was imagined had also been perceived, and make an old 
judgment on the basis of having a memory of imagining a picture. Alternatively, they may 
simply be incorrectly interpreting the instructions and using the old response to indicate 
that they had encountered the item in any form, as opposed to specifically having studied 
the picture itself. Therefore, the false memory effect in Experiments 1a and 1b may have 
resulted from participants knowingly choosing to use the old response for items that they 
knew they had only previously imagined.  
Experiment 2 involved a source-monitoring test which gave participants the option to 
indicate that they had previously imagined a picture without actually having seen it. Note 
that unlike other studies which have used a source monitoring test in an imagination 
inflation procedure (e.g., Henkel & Franklin, 1998), the current procedure involves the 
presentation of pictures rather than word cues in the source monitoring test. Thus, as 
opposed to introspecting about whether a given object had been perceived and imagined or 
only imagined, participants study each picture and make a judgment about whether they   43 
have encountered this particular picture, or imagined a different exemplar of the same 
object.  
The key comparison in this experiment is that between imagined and new items that 
are incorrectly identified as having been studied. The response options provided at test in 
this experiment gets around the problem of participants being forced to use the old response 
for imagined items when in fact they only remember having imagined it or seen the 
object‟s name. If participants still claim to have actually seen more of the imagined pictures 
than new pictures, there is stronger evidence that the false memory induction procedure has 
resulted in a memory of actually having studied a picture.  
 
3.2 Experiment 2 
Method 
  Participants 
  Fifty-three participants were drawn from the same pool as those in previous 
experiments; 29 participants were assigned to the recognition condition and 24 to the 
source monitoring condition. 
Design and Procedure 
The materials, design and procedure used in this experiment were identical to those 
of Experiments 1a and 1b with the exception of the test phase. The experiment was a mixed 
design, with item type (seen/imagined/new) as the within-subjects variable and test 
(recognition/source monitoring) as the between-subjects variable. The experiment was 
completed in one 30 minute session and involved a study phase in which participants 
labelled a set of pictures, an imagery phase where they tried to recall whether the pictures   44 
they had seen in the study phase had been presented in black and white or colour, and a test 
phase which differed between the two conditions. Apart from the test, the procedure was 
identical in all conditions. 
Test Phase: Recognition Test. This version of the test was identical to the recognition 
portion of the test phase in Experiment 1a, except that there was no remember/know 
procedure for old responses. Participants were shown the 40 items one by one and made 
old/new judgments using the \ and / keys in their own time with no practice phase or 
feedback. 
Test Phase: Source-monitoring Test. In this version of the test, participants were 
shown the 40 pictures one by one and asked to make a source judgment. Participants were 
instructed to indicate on each trial whether the picture was one they had perceived and 
imagined (i.e., this item had appeared as a picture in the study phase), a picture they had 
only imagined (i.e., this item had appeared in previous phases of the experiment as a word 
only), or a new picture. Keys corresponding to these options were labelled “P”, “I” and “N” 
respectively and responses were made by pressing the appropriate key. Participants made 
judgments in their own time while viewing the pictures one by one, with no practice phase 
or feedback. 
Results 
Study and Imagery Phases 
Participants in the two conditions did not differ significantly on any measures of 
performance in the study and imagery phases. The data summarised below thus represent 
the performance of all 53 participants. Accuracy in the study phase was high – performance 
ranged from 86.0% to 100% correct identification of pictures from a choice of two labels,   45 
with a mean score of 96.5%. Participants were reasonably accurate in determining whether 
they had seen pictures in black and white or colour during the study phase. Responses to 
the 10 critical imagined items which had not appeared in the study phase were excluded 
from the analysis. The mean score was 62.6% (SD = 9.09), which was significantly 
different from the chance level of 50%, t(52) = 10.11, p < .001. When asked to indicate 
confidence on a 1 to 5 scale, participants were significantly more confident in their answers 
to the 80 items which had appeared in the study phase (M = 3.41) than to the 10 imagined 
items for which there was no correct response, (M = 2.31); t(52) = 11.27, SEM = .10, r = 
.68, p < .001. 
Test Phase 
Figure 3.1 shows the proportion of old responses on the recognition test to seen, 
imagined and new items, as well as the proportion of perceived and imagined responses to 
these items on the source monitoring test. Old and perceived and imagined responses on 
the recognition and source monitoring tests respectively can be seen to represent hits to 
seen items and false alarms to imagined and new items. An overall analysis on the old and 
perceived and imagined responses was conducted using a mixed ANOVA, with item type 
(seen/imagined/new) as the within-subjects variable and test (recognition/source 
monitoring) as the between-subjects variable.    46 
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Figure 3.1: Proportion of old responses on the recognition test and perceived and imagined 
responses on the source monitoring test to seen, imagined, and new items in Experiment 2. 
 
Participants showed different response patterns on the recognition and source 
monitoring tests: the overall ANOVA showed a significant main effect of test, F(1, 51) = 
4.65, MSE = .05, partial ŋ
2 = .08, p < .05, and an interaction between test and item type, 
F(1.74, 88.78) = 8.95, MSE = .03, partial ŋ
2 = .15, p < .001 (Mauchly‟s test indicated that 
the assumption of sphericity had been violated for the main effect of the within-subjects 
variable, item type: χ²(2) = 8.06, p < .05; a Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of sphericity was 
used to correct degrees of freedom, ε = .87).  In order to explore this interaction further, 
individual between-subjects ANOVAs were performed for seen, imagined, and new items. 
While there was no significant difference in the response patterns for seen or new items 
between the two test conditions (both Fs < 1.5), test format had a significant effect on false 
alarms to imagined items, F(1, 51) = 10.78, MSE = .06, partial ŋ
2 = .18, p < .005. 
Furthermore, baseline bias as defined by the criterion set in the seen-new item comparison 
did not differ between the source monitoring test (M = .44) and the recognition test (M =   47 
.42; p = .39; see Appendix B). Thus, allowing participants the additional response option 
reduced the number of false alarms on imagined trials on the source monitoring test (M = 
.13) as compared to the recognition test (M = .35) without affecting the number of hits or 
the number of false alarms to new items.  
The overall ANOVA also revealed a main effect of item type: the likelihood of 
participants responding old or perceived and imagined to an item was dependent upon its 
status, F(1.74, 88.78) = 269.62, MSE = .03, partial ŋ
2 = .84, p < .001 (Greenhouse-Geisser, 
ε = .87). This was true for both the recognition and source-monitoring conditions, as 
verified by individual within-subjects ANOVAs for each condition (both Fs > 90). 
Furthermore, in each condition, participants made more such false alarms to imagined 
items than to new items; for the recognition test, t(28) = 5.68, SEM = .05, r = .53, p < .001; 
and for the source monitoring test, t(23) = 3.39, SEM = .02, r = .33, p < .005. Despite 
having the option of assigning imagined items to a separate imagined response category, 
participants still claimed to have actually perceived these items more often than new items. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 compared the standard recognition test employed in Experiments 1a 
and 1b with a source monitoring test in which participants were given an additional 
response option. Unlike in Experiments 1a and 1b where participants were forced to 
classify three distinct types of items into two categories, the current test included three 
response options which reflected the three different ways participants had interacted with 
the stimuli (via perception, via imagination, or not at all). When given the option to indicate 
that an item had only been imagined, participants still claimed to have actually perceived 
significantly more of the pictures that had been imagined compared to new items from the   48 
same categories. This result implies that false memory for imagined items in the current 
procedure cannot simply be attributed to a relaxed criterion or misunderstanding of 
instructions.  
False memory can arise from both perceptual (i.e., data-driven, relating to surface 
features) and conceptual (i.e., semantic, relating to meaning) processes. For instance, in the 
standard DRM paradigm, the activation of critical lures is predominantly conceptual in 
nature, as studied words evoke the lure via semantic associations. Other studies, however, 
have used the same framework but achieved activation of the critical lures via perceptual 
processes (e.g., Sommers & Lewis, 1999; Schacter, Verfaellie, & Anes, 1997). In these 
experiments, participants study lists that are phonologically as opposed to semantically 
related to lures. In the current procedure, imagined pictures may be activated both 
conceptually (i.e., because the names of the objects they represent have been studied), and 
perceptually (i.e., because the objects are imagined). However, it is not clear which of the 
two makes a greater contribution to the false recognition effect. One hypothesis is that false 
recognition of the non-presented pictures, much like a true recognition of the pictures that 
had actually been perceived, arises because there is a memory trace which contains 
perceptual features that partially match those of that particular picture. The opposite 
hypothesis is that no such perceptual memory trace exists; instead, false recognition of a 
non-presented picture is the result of conceptual activation.  
Henkel and Franklin (1998) asked a similar question in their imagination inflation 
study. Participants imagined objects which were either perceptually or conceptually related 
to other objects that they were actually shown in pictures. Perceptually related items were 
physically similar in form (e.g., magnifying glass and lollipop), while conceptually related   49 
items came from the same functional category (e.g., apple and banana). At test, 
participants were shown the names of objects which had been perceived, objects which had 
been imagined, and new objects, and asked to identify the source. Henkel and Franklin 
(Experiment 2) found that conceptual and perceptual relatedness of perceived and imagined 
items contributed equally to inflating incorrect claims of having perceived pictures of 
objects that had been imagined. Specifically, imagined objects that were similar in form to 
studied pictures were incorrectly attributed to prior perception as often as imagined objects 
that were semantically related to studied pictures, and the highest levels of such false 
alarms was made to pictures that were both similar in form to one picture and semantically 
related to another. In Experiment 3, the imagery task was adapted so that the type of 
processing involved was either perceptual or conceptual in nature in order to compare the 
relative contributions of the two processes to false recognition in the current paradigm.  
 
3.3 Experiment 3 
In the current experiment, the procedure used in Experiment 2 was modified to 
include two different conditions in which everything except imagery phase instructions was 
held constant. The imagery task in this experiment did not require participants to make 
judgments about how the pictures had been presented in the study phase. In the perceptual 
condition, participants imagined or tried to recall pictures of objects in response to their 
names, while in the conceptual condition, participants imagined sentences in response to 
the same words. Note that the perceptual condition in this case cannot be thought of as 
purely perceptual as it does not exclude conceptual activation arising from presentation of 
the word. Thus, we can only hypothesise about the potential role of perceptual processes by   50 
looking at any reduction in false recognition that arises from eliminating instructions to 
imagine a picture, and cannot make claims regarding whether false recognition could have 
arisen via perceptual processing alone. Instead, the perceptual condition could be seen as a 
condition which combines both conceptual and perceptual activation, which in Henkel and 
Franklin‟s (1998) study produced the highest level of source confusion. If perceptual 
activation contributes towards the false recognition effect observed so far, participants in 
the perceptual condition should claim to have perceived more of the pictures that they only 
studied as words than participants in the conceptual condition. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-five Undergraduate students aged 18-21 (M = 19.3) from University College 
London took part in this study and were reimbursed for their time. Twenty-one participants 
were assigned to the perceptual condition and 14 participants to the conceptual condition. 
Design and Procedure 
The materials, design and procedure used in this experiment were based on those of 
Experiment 2; the differences are detailed below. The experiment was a mixed design, with 
item type (seen/imagined/new) as the within-subjects variable, and imagery 
(perceptual/conceptual) as the between-subjects variable. 
Study Phase. The study phase was almost identical to those of the previous 
experiments, except for the number of times participants encountered the critical imagined 
items, which was decreased from four times in previous experiments (once in the imagery 
phase and three times in the study phase, as an incorrect option in the picture labelling task) 
to just once in the current experiment (in the imagery phase only). In order to do this, the   51 
word pool from which the incorrect options were drawn in the study phase labelling task 
was altered. In the current experiment, the incorrect option always corresponded to the 
name of another picture participants would see during the study phase, and never to the 
name of a critical imagined item. Although this manipulation could have the potential 
effect of weakening the false memory induction, the original procedure would have 
interfered with the imagery manipulation in the current experiment as participants are 
explicitly asked to imagine pictures in response to the verbal labels in the study phase task. 
Imagery Phase. The general format of the imagery phase, including presentation 
times, was similar to those of previous experiments: participants were presented with words 
for 4000 msec each and made a response to each word. As in previous experiments, 
participants were informed that the words they were about to see related to the pictures they 
had seen earlier on. In the perceptual condition, participants were asked to imagine the 
picture that the word referred to, and rate the pleasantness of this image. In the conceptual 
condition, participants were asked to think of a sentence using the word, and rate the 
pleasantness of the sentence. Aside from these instructions, there was no difference 
between conditions. In both conditions, participants made responses on the same scale, 
from 1 = not at all pleasant to 5 = extremely pleasant.  
Test Phase. This phase was the same in the two conditions, and test items were 
identical to those in previous experiments. Participants were shown the 40 pictures one by 
one and asked to make a source judgment. They were instructed to indicate whether they 
had studied the picture AND its label, its label only, or whether it was a new item that they 
had not previously encountered in the experiment. The response options were the 
equivalent of those in Experiment 2, so perceived and imagined became picture and label   52 
while imagined became label; this was done so as to make the response options appropriate 
to the conceptual condition, where participants had not imagined a sentence instead of a 
picture. Keys corresponding to these options were labelled “P”, “L” and “N” respectively 
and responses were made by pressing the appropriate key. Participants made judgments in 
their own time while viewing the picture, with no practice phase or feedback. 
Results 
Study and Imagery Phases 
Participants in the two conditions did not differ significantly on any measures of 
performance in the study and imagery phases. The data summarised below thus represent 
the performance of all 35 participants. Accuracy in the study phase was high as in the 
previous experiments, with a mean score of 97.0% across the two imagery conditions; there 
were no differences in this measure between conditions (p > .6). Pleasantness ratings in the 
imagery task were almost identical across the two imagery conditions (M = 3.18, p >.9) and 
did not differ depending on whether participants had seen pictures referring to the words in 
the study phase (i.e., between the 10 imagined items and the 80 items that had appeared in 
the study phase; p > .5). 
Test Phase 
Figure 3.2 shows the proportion of picture and label responses to items in the source 
monitoring test by imagery condition.    53 
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Figure 3.2: Proportion of picture and label responses to seen, imagined, and new items in 
the perceptual and conceptual imagery conditions in Experiment 3. 
 
An overall analysis on these responses was conducted using a mixed ANOVA, with 
item type (seen/imagined/new) as the within-subjects variable and imagery 
(perceptual/conceptual) as the between-subjects variable. Across the two conditions, the 
likelihood of participants responding picture and label to an item was dependent upon its 
status, F(1.43, 47.33) = 269.38, MSE = .03, partial ŋ
2 = .89, p < .001 (Mauchly‟s test 
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for the main effect of the 
within-subjects variable, item type: χ²(2) = 16.06, p < .001; a Greenhouse-Geisser estimate 
of sphericity was used to correct degrees of freedom, ε = .72). The proportion of hits to 
pictures which had appeared in the study phase (M = .74) as well as false alarms to pictures 
which had appeared as words in the imagery phase (M = .11) were both significantly higher 
than the proportion of false alarms to new pictures (M = .06; t(34) = 18.46, SEM = .04, r = 
.91, p < .001 and t(34) = 2.51, SEM = .02, r = .19, p < .05 respectively).  
Crucially, the imagery manipulation did not have an effect on responses and there   54 
was no interaction between imagery and item type (Fs < 1). In other words, whether 
participants imagined pictures (perceptual) or sentences (conceptual) in the imagery phase 
did not affect the proportion of false alarms they made to these items on the picture source 
monitoring test. The bias data for the seen-new comparison indicate that although the 
response criterion was numerically lower in the conceptual condition (M = .27) than the 
perceptual condition (M = .40), this difference did not reach significance (p = .33; see 
Appendix B). A cross-experimental comparison confirmed that the number of times items 
that had only appeared as words were incorrectly deemed to have been perceived did not 
differ significantly between Experiment 2 where participants encountered the words four 
times (M = .13), and the current experiments where participants encountered them only 
once in the imagery phase (M = .11; p = .65). An examination of the imagined (Experiment 
2, M = .75) and label (current experiment, M = .61) responses to these items, on the other 
hand, indicates that participants benefited significantly from having encountered the words 
in the study phase when it came to correctly identifying them at test, t(57) = 2.41, SEM = 
.06, partial ŋ
2 =  .30, p < .05. 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 fulfilled two aims: replicating the pattern of results found in 
Experiment 2 with two new imagery tasks, and evaluating the contribution of perceptual 
and conceptual processes to the false recognition effect. In the source monitoring test, 
participants presumably attempt to match the attributes of the stimulus to their memory of 
the item, and will indicate that they had previously perceived the picture if there is a match 
between the two. There are thus two possible factors that might lead to participants making 
false alarms to imagined items. One factor, present in both the conceptual and perceptual   55 
versions of the imagery task, is the conceptual activation of the object depicted in the 
picture that arises from having studied its name. Another factor, which occurs in the 
perceptual condition only, is perceptual activation arising from imagination of the object. If 
the image participants create in response to a particular word is sufficiently similar to the 
picture itself to produce a strong match between the stimulus and the memory of the 
imagined item, this might lead participants to believe they had perceived the picture. If 
perceptual activation was a significant driver of the false recognition effect, we would have 
expected to see higher levels of false recognition in the perceptual as compared to the 
conceptual imagery condition. However, participants made no fewer picture and label 
responses to imagined items when they were instructed to imagine sentences instead of 
pictures, thus eliminating the perceptual component of the task.  
Two caveats are to be noted here. Firstly, the conceptual imagery task could have 
been contaminated by perceptual processes. Although there were no instructions in the 
conceptual condition relating to imagination of pictorial representations, participants may 
have spontaneously imagined pictures of the object while reading the object‟s name and 
imagining a sentence. There is indeed some evidence that participants spontaneously 
produce images of objects as a result of interacting with the objects‟ names (e.g., Foley, 
Durso, Wilder, & Friedman, 1991; Foley & Foy, 2008). Secondly, the imagery task in 
Experiment 3 was manipulated with reference to Henkel and Franklin‟s (1998) 
perceptual/conceptual similarity manipulation, where the additive condition in which the 
imagined object was similar to a studied picture both semantically and in terms of 
perceptual features produced the highest level of source confusion. However, there was a 
key difference between their procedure and the one employed here. Henkel and Franklin   56 
investigated the contribution of perceptual and conceptual processing without manipulating 
the imagery task participants engaged in, while in Experiment 3 type of processing was 
manipulated by giving participants different imagery instructions: in the conceptual 
condition, participants were instructed to imagine a sentence, while in the perceptual case, 
participants were instructed to imagine a picture. Intraub and Hoffman (1992) found that 
reading a paragraph describing a visual scene lead to more incorrect claims of having 
studied the associated scene itself when there were no imagery instructions. According to 
Intraub and Hoffman‟s interpretation of the source monitoring framework, the explicit 
picture imagination instructions in the perceptual condition decrease source confusion 
between seen and imagined pictures because the memory of cognitive operations involved 
in the imagination process serve to alert participants to the fact that they had generated the 
image rather than seen it. In the case of spontaneous imagery, on the other hand, there will 
be no record of such cognitive processes and thus no cue that the image was self-generated. 
The use of such a monitoring strategy could explain why there was no difference in false 
recognition between the conceptual and perceptual conditions. 
 
3.4 Discussion of Experiments 2 and 3 
In Experiments 1a and 1b, participants may have made false alarms to imagined 
items because they misinterpreted the old response option on the recognition test and called 
pictures old if they remembered having studied the associated word. The results of 
Experiments 2 and 3 discredit the hypothesis that participants are always aware of not 
having studied the pictures. In other words, there is evidence to suggest that in at least some 
cases, when shown a picture of an object that had only appeared as a word, participants will   57 
actually recognise this picture as having been studied. However, at least some of the effect 
is likely to be driven by diffuse familiarity, as evidenced by the difference in false alarms to 
imagined items in Experiments 2 and 3 compared with Experiments 1a and 1b.  
Experiment 3 demonstrated that the false recognition effect was not dependent on the 
specific imagery task employed in Experiments 1a and 1b. Even when asked to perform a 
conceptual task on the object name (imagining a sentence which used that word), 
participants were just as likely to incorrectly claim they had seen the associated picture. 
The finding that imagining a picture is no more effective in making people think they had 
studied it than imagining a sentence leads to the tentative conclusion that perceptual 
processes are not responsible for this effect. However, it does not rule out the possibility 
that false memories of non-presented items do contain perceptual features. This possibility 
was further tested in Chapter 6. In Chapter 4 (Experiment 4), another type of direct test was 
used: participants were presented with two pictures side by side and asked to indicate 
which of the two pictures had been studied. The key question is whether participants will 
respond to studied pictures differently when these are paired with either imagined or new 
pictures. 
   58 
CHAPTER 4: FALSE MEMORY FOR PICTURES ON A FORCED CHOICE TEST 
 
So far, four experiments have successfully demonstrated a new procedure that rapidly 
induces false memory for distinctive pictures. In each experiment, attempts have been made 
to verify that this effect is not solely due to a relaxed response criterion. In Experiment 1a, 
participants not only claimed to have seen imagined items, but also indicated that they 
remembered their specific occurrence in the study phase. In Experiment 1b, participants 
endorsed imagined items as old with high confidence. Finally, in Experiments 2 and 3, 
participants indicated that they had actually seen imagined pictures even when they could 
have classified them as imagined. These data all point towards the conclusion that 
participants are reporting a genuine false memory. However, it is still possible that 
participants claimed to have seen pictures of imagined objects when they only remembered 
having studied their names because of the high correlation between these two events. In 
Experiment 4, an even stricter test was used to reject this possibility. 
In a forced choice test, participants are presented with pairs of items, usually where 
one is old and the other new, and asked to indicate which of the two they had studied. This 
test is considered to be superior to standard old/new recognition because it is not affected 
by the criterion set by participants (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Shepard & Chang, 
1963). In addition, this task is also much simpler for the participant than a test in which 
each item has to be classified individually. In fact, this is the task used by Shepard (1967) 
in his famous study where participants achieved 99.7% correct recognition of pictures after 
a 2-hour delay.    59 
Consider the experiments presented here so far: on seen trials, participants may 
correctly and with great ease identify the pictures they recall seeing, but on imagined trials 
where they recall seeing a word but not the associated picture, they may apply a rule that 
allows an old response in cases where the memory of the associated word is particularly 
strong; the two strategies are not mutually exclusive. In a forced choice test, this sort of 
dual-basis decision strategy is impossible. Therefore, unless there are genuine false 
memories of imagined pictures, participants should choose the seen picture as often on 
trials where a seen picture is presented alongside an imagined picture, as on trials in which 
it is presented alongside a new picture. 
 
4.1 Experiment 4 
The present experiment involved a two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) test which 
allowed pairs of items to be compared directly. Participants were presented with two items 
side by side and asked which of the two pictures they had previously studied. Each 
combination of items (seen-imagined, seen-new, and imagined-new) was tested; in seen-
imagined and seen-new pairs, only the seen item had been studied and was therefore the 
correct response, while in imagined-new pairs, neither item had been studied so there was 
no correct response. The prediction for imagined-new pairs does not depend on whether 
participants genuinely remember having studied the imagined pictures or only remember 
having studied the associated word: in either case, participants should choose the imagined 
item more often. While the memory explanation attributes this choice to an underlying 
memory of the imagined item, it is also reasonable to speculate that in the absence of a   60 
memory for either picture, participants will either guess at random or choose the imagined 
item due to having been exposed to it in some form. 
In the absence of memory for imagined pictures, seen-imagined and seen-new pairs 
should yield the same level of accuracy. Based on the results from previous experiments, 
however, it is possible that participants may find it more difficult to correctly select the 
studied item from seen-imagined than seen-new pairs, even though in both cases there is an 
equal chance that they will have correctly identified the picture as having been studied if it 
had been presented alone. This would be a highly counterintuitive result, and would 
provide very strong evidence that the false alarms to imagined items obtained in the current 
procedure reflect genuine memory illusions.  
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-nine undergraduates aged 18-20 (M = 18.7) participated in the experiment as 
part of a course requirement.  
Materials 
 The test phase in the current experiment required double the number of critical items 
used in the previous experiments reported here. For this reason, the number of items in 
each phase of the experiment was modified, although the same corpus of 110 categorised 
pictures was used. The number of critical items was increased from 30 to 60, and these 60 
pictures were divided into three groups of 20 items which were rotated through the seen, 
imagined, and new conditions. The remaining 50 non-critical items appeared as pictures in 
the study phase only for participants in every condition. In the study phase, participants 
were presented with a list of 70 pictures, consisting of the 20 seen critical items and the 50   61 
non-critical items. In the imagery phase, participants studied 70 words: 20 seen items, 20 
imagined items which replaced 20 of the non-critical items from the study phase, and 30 
filler items from the study phase. Finally, in the test phase, participants all saw the same 60 
critical items, which were presented in pairs of seen-new, seen-imagined, and imagined-
new items (see below). 
Design 
Pair type (seen-new/seen-imagined/imagined-new) was manipulated within subjects, 
and the dependent measure was the proportion of trials on which participants chose the first 
item in each pair for each pair type.  
Procedure 
The present experiment was similar to Experiments 1-3 in terms of structure (study 
phase, imagery phase, test phase), with the modifications detailed below. 
Study Phase. Aside from the items (see Materials), the study phase was identical to 
that of Experiment 3. The incorrect option in the labelling task always corresponded to 
another picture participants would see during the study phase, and never to one of the 
imagined items. Participants thus did not encounter the imagined items until the imagery 
phase. The imagery phase instructions and procedure were identical to those of 
Experiments 1-2, where participants were shown words and asked to recall whether the 
associated picture had appeared in colour or in black and white in the study phase. 
Test Phase. The test phase involved making judgments on pairs of pictures. 
Participants were shown two pictures side by side and asked to indicate which of the two 
pictures (left or right) they had previously studied. Following this judgment, participants 
indicated their confidence on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 = not at all confident and 5 =   62 
extremely confident. There were 10 each of three types of trials: seen-new, seen-imagined, 
and imagined-new, and the position (left or right) of the items was randomised with the 
constraint that each item within each pair appeared in each position exactly five times. 
Results 
Study and Imagery Phases 
Performance in the study phase ranged from 91.4% to 100% correct identification of 
pictures from a choice of two labels, with a mean score of 97.1%. Mean performance in the 
imagery phase, where participants had to indicate if the picture had appeared in colour or in 
black and white in the study phase, was 63.6% (SD = 8.9) for the 50 items which had 
appeared in the study phase. This was roughly equivalent to performance in the imagery 
phase in Experiments 1 and 2, and significantly different from the chance level of 50%, 
t(38) = 9.62, p < .001. On the 1 to 5 confidence scale, participants were significantly more 
confident on their answers to seen items (M = 3.55) than to imagined items (M = 1.94); 
t(38) = 12.04, SEM = .14, r = .68, p < .001. 
Test Phase 
All three stimulus pairs (seen-new, seen-imagined, and imagined-new) were used in 
the analysis. Figure 4.1 shows the probability of choosing the first item in each pair for 
each pair type, which represents accuracy in the case of the seen-new and seen-imagined 
pairs. The probability of choosing the correct option from a seen-imagined pair (M = .86) 
was lower than that of choosing the correct option from a seen-new pair (M = .96; t(38) = 
3.70, SEM = .03, r = .40, p < .001, indicating that participants found it more difficult to 
correctly identify the studied picture when they had previously imagined the other picture 
in the pair than when the other picture was new. For the imagined-new pair, a one-sample t-  63 
test confirmed that participants chose the imagined picture at .22 above the chance level of 
0.50, t(38) =  7.94, SEM = .03, p < .001.  
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Figure 4.1: Probability of choosing the first item in each type for seen-new, seen-imagined, 
and imagined-new pairs in Experiment 4. The dashed line represents chance performance. 
 
Due to the low number of incorrect trials, confidence was compared by pair type 
rather than by response. Participants did not differ significantly in the confidence ratings 
they assigned to seen-new pair decisions (M = 4.01) and seen-imagined pair decisions, (M 
= 3.91, p = .28), but were far less confident on imagined-new pairs (M = 2.27; compared 
with seen-new pairs, t(38) = 10.45, SEM = .17, r = .75, p < .001). The time taken for 
participants to make a response on each trial was also recorded and is shown broken down 
by pair type in Figure 4.2 (data were removed for the two participants whose mean time to 
respond across all three pair types was more than two standard deviations away from the 
mean). Participants deliberated on average 269 msec longer on seen-imagined trials than on 
seen-new trials, t(36) = 2.03, SEM = 132, r = .16, p < .05.   64 
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Figure 4.2: Time taken to make a decision on seen-new, seen-imagined, and imagined-new 
pairs in Experiment 4. These data are based on 36 of the 38 participants due to outliers. 
 
Discussion 
In Experiments 1-3, participants evaluated items individually and consistently 
responded differently to imagined and new items. In Experiment 4, comparisons were made 
between two items presented side by side. Of most interest is the comparison between seen-
imagined and seen-new pairs: participants performed seen-imagined decisions with less 
accuracy than seen-new decisions. With respect to the seen picture, the task of selecting 
this picture from a seen-imagined pair should be equivalent to that of selecting it from a 
seen-new pair. The likelihood that the seen picture was encoded and would have been 
recognised on a standard old/new recognition test is equal between the two conditions. In 
the current procedure, on the other hand, one factor which can make a forced-choice 
decision more difficult is the similarity between alternatives. For instance, in the DRM   65 
paradigm, one might predict that deciding between a list word and an unrelated item will 
always be easier than deciding between a list word and the critical item, simply because of 
the semantic relationship between the two (there have, in fact, been no published studies 
applying the forced choice test procedure to the DRM paradigm, but see McDermott, Chan, 
& Weinstein (2009) for some initial findings). In the current procedure, on the other hand, 
the items were fully counterbalanced, so the two items in a seen-imagined pair would 
always be equally similar in terms of perceptual features compared to those in a seen-new 
pair. Nevertheless, participants found it harder to correctly select the seen picture when the 
name of the object in the alternative picture had been presented in the imagery phase than 
when the alternative object have never been named. Note that the accuracy rate for seen-
new pairs was extremely high, and very similar to that obtained by Shepard (1967) in his 
much-cited study showing ceiling levels of recognition performance for pictures in a forced 
choice procedure. 
An argument can be made for predicting lower accuracy on seen-imagined trials 
compared to seen-new trials that is not contingent on participants having a genuine false 
memory of the imagined pictures. This argument is based on the assumption that 
participants did not encode some of the pictures in the study phase (e.g., because they were 
not paying attention at the time they were presented), and have to make a guess on any 
trials where these appear alongside another picture that they do not recognise. In the case of 
seen-new trials, the two pictures should appear equally familiar and participants will thus 
select each of the two items with an equal probability of .5. In the case of seen-imagined 
trials, on the other hand, the imagined item may feel more familiar because its name was 
encountered in the imagery phase, so participants may default to choosing this item.   66 
Applying this logic to the current data, given the .04 error rate for seen-new pairs, 
participants may actually have been guessing on .08 of seen-new trials (i.e., on twice as 
many trials than the number they got wrong, because a guess yields a .5 success rate), 
which, when rounded up to the nearest number of trials, amounts to 1 trial per participant. 
If the same number of guesses were made on seen-imagined trials, and participants always 
chose the imagined item in these cases
2, we would expect the accuracy rate for seen-
imagined trials to be around .9 (i.e., 9 out of 10 trials); in fact, it was significantly lower 
than that (t(38) = 1.77, SEM = .02, p < .05, one-tailed). Even with this strict criterion, there 
is evidence that studying the name of a picture and imagining it interfered with 
participants‟ ability to reject it in favour of another picture which had actually been seen 15 
minutes previously. 
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CHAPTER 5: FALSE MEMORY ON INDIRECT TESTS: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
While memory can be investigated via both direct (or explicit, conscious, intentional) 
and indirect (or implicit, unconscious, unintentional) tests, most of the research into false 
memory so far has employed direct recognition or recall tests. In all the procedures 
described here up to this point, participants explicitly report having seen items they did not 
study. Indirect tests, on the other hand, do not depend on participants using a conscious 
decision strategy. Instead, prior exposure facilitates performance on certain tasks including 
lexical decision (Ratcliff et al., 1985) and picture naming. Recently, researchers have 
investigated whether false memory for critical lures in the DRM paradigm is exhibited on 
indirect as well as direct tests. Given the limited amount of research on the subject, this 
chapter is devoted to a thorough review of all the studies which have addressed this issue. 
The striking result in the standard version of the DRM paradigm is that true and false 
memories are reported at equal rates and thus appear to be indistinguishable by a simple 
recognition test. While it has already been shown that true and false memories tested 
directly can be dissociated using procedures such as repeated study (Robinson & Roediger, 
1997), it is interesting to see whether indirect tests can also help distinguish between the 
two. The most intuitive hypothesis is that non-presented critical lures should not facilitate 
performance on an indirect test that benefits from prior perception. However, if false 
memories can acquire perceptual details (e.g., Lampinen et al., 2005), a contrasting 
hypothesis would be that activation of related items could lead to priming by a similar 
mechanism to perception. In Chapter 6, the new procedure proposed in this dissertation is   68 
used to test whether the false memory of an imagined picture behaves like a true memory 
of a perceived picture on a perceptual indirect test. 
Indirect tests can be roughly divided into those that tap into the perceptual and 
conceptual details of studied stimuli. Indirect perceptual tests such as speeded recognition 
of degraded stimuli rely on the identification of perceptual features, while indirect 
conceptual tests such as word association access an item‟s meaning. It has generally been 
found that performance on indirect conceptual tests is facilitated for critical lures as well as 
for studied items, while the behaviour of critical lures on indirect perceptual tests is more 
controversial. All the studies so far that have investigated this question (often referring to 
the phenomenon as “false implicit memory”) have used verbal rather than pictorial stimuli. 
Some studies claim to have found significant priming on perceptual tests for critical lures 
even though they were never perceived at study (e.g., McKone & Murphy, 2000), but other 
studies have challenged such results by conducting experiments with stricter controls for 
awareness (e.g., McBride, Coane, & Raulerson, 2006). Convincing results showing 
perceptual priming of critical lures equivalent to that of studied words could lead to the 
strong conclusion that true and false memories in the DRM paradigm do not differ in terms 
of perceptual attributes. The main findings of this line of enquiry are discussed below, 
followed by an empirical extension in Chapter 6 to pictorial stimuli using the procedure 
presented in previous chapters. 
 
5.1 False Memory for Verbal Stimuli on Indirect Tests 
False memory for verbal stimuli has been investigated using the following indirect 
tests: word-stem completion (Hicks & Starns, 2005; McBride et al., 2006; McDermott,   69 
1997; McKone & Murphy, 2000); word-fragment completion (McDermott, 1997; McKone 
& Murphy, 2000); lexical decision (Hancock, Hicks, Marsh, & Ritschel, 2003; McKone, 
2004; Meade, Watson, Balota, & Roediger, 2006; Tse & Neely, 2005; Whittlesea, 2002; 
Zeelenberg & Pecher, 2002; word association (McDermott, 1997); word naming 
(Whittlesea, 2002 perceptual identification (Hicks & Starns, 2005); and anagram solving 
(Lövdén & Johansson, 2003). 
McDermott (1997) found that priming of critical lures on a conceptual test (word 
association) was equivalent to priming of studied items, while priming for critical lures on 
word-stem completion and word fragment completion tests (both putative perceptual tests) 
was significant but generally lower than that of studied items. In the word-stem completion 
test, subjects are presented with three-letter stems such as CHA__ and, without reference to 
the study phase, instructed to produce the first suitable word that comes to mind. Memory 
is then assessed by the number of times a stem is completed by a particular word under 
conditions where this word had or had not appeared in the study phase (or, in the case of a 
critical item in the DRM paradigm, where its associates had or had not appeared). The 
word fragment completion test is scored in the same way, but test probes are partially 
completed words such as C_AI_. McKone and Murphy (2000) replicated word-stem and 
word fragment completion findings with stricter methodological controls. These authors 
used word norms to match critical lures and list items, which is not done in the standard 
DRM procedure, and excluded participants who claimed to use explicit retrieval strategies.  
However, McBride et al. (2006) found significant priming for lures on word-stem 
completion only in those participants who were deemed “test-aware” (20/54 participants)   70 
because they had noticed that some of the word-stems could be completed with items from 
the study phase. 
The transfer-appropriate processing (TAP) framework proposes that performance on 
indirect tests that rely on perceptual processes should be sensitive to changes in 
presentation modality. For instance, Blaxton (1989) showed that priming on a word-
fragment completion task was greatest when presentation modality (auditory/visual) was 
kept constant between study and test. Is priming of critical lures on the word-stem 
completion task modality-specific? If critical lures are primed in the same way as studied 
items, they should also be affected by a modality change from study to test. For instance, 
critical lures of lists studied aurally should be less facilitated on a visual word-stem 
completion test than critical lures of lists studied visually. If this is not found to be the case, 
the priming exhibited for critical items on perceptual indirect tests must arise from non-
perceptual activation. 
McKone and Murphy (2000) compared priming of critical lures in participants who 
had studied either visual or auditory lists. In this between-subjects design, priming of 
critical lures on a visual word-stem completion task was reduced by a mismatch between 
study and test modality. Hicks and Starns (2005), on the other hand, found that while 
critical lure priming on a visual word-stem-completion task was significant (though lower 
than list item priming), this priming was unaffected by a within-subjects manipulation of 
modality (visual/auditory), unlike priming of list items. Hicks and Starns suggested that if 
priming of critical lures can withstand a change in modality, the representations of these 
unstudied items could be non-specific in terms of modality and thus unlike the 
representations of studied items. Instead of being based on perceptually encoded   71 
information, critical lures could be activated conceptually. Although word-stem completion 
is considered to be a perceptual test, it is more conceptually driven than perceptual 
identification (Marsolek & Andresen, 2005). Using a version of the latter, where words 
were presented for identification for 24ms followed by a backward mask, Hicks and Starns 
found priming for critical lures only when these were actually included in the study lists 
and not when they were activated using the standard DRM procedure. Lövdén and 
Johansson (2003) also found evidence to suggest that critical lure priming in so-called 
perceptual tasks is not dependent on visual representations. They found significant 
facilitation for critical lures on an anagram task, but this priming was eradicated when 
articulation was suppressed. Whether priming of critical lures is modality-specific 
addresses the same issue as studies that examined whether false memories tend to be 
reported in the same modality as list items (e.g., Hicks & Hancock, 2002). The conflicting 
findings reviewed above suggest that while the representations of false memories may not 
be as perceptually rich as those of true memories, it is possible that some activation of 
perceptual attributes does occur, leading to facilitated performance on indirect perceptual 
tests. 
Lexical decision is another indirect test that is generally considered to be perceptually 
based and has produced mixed results for critical lures in the DRM paradigm. In lexical 
decision, subjects must classify probes as words or non-words at speed. There has been 
some inconsistency in the findings as to whether performance on lexical decision is 
facilitated for non-presented critical lures. Zeelenberg and Pecher (2002) found no priming 
of critical lures on a lexical decision task using McDermott‟s (1997) procedure which 
resulted in significant priming on two other perceptually-based indirect memory tasks   72 
described above, word-stem and word-fragment completion. McKone (2004) also found no 
priming of critical lures on lexical decision using the normalised stimuli from McKone and 
Murphy (2000).  
The studies described above administered the lexical decision task at the end of the 
entire study period, once all the lists had been studied, and found no priming for non-
presented critical lures. Three other studies administered separate lexical decision tests after 
study of each list. This procedure is designed to reveal the automatic spreading activation 
that is thought to be responsible for the formation of false memories. Hancock et al. (2003) 
found facilitation for critical lures on a lexical decision task compared to control words 
matched for length and word frequency. Subjects performed lexical decision even quicker 
for lures than for list items when 14 associates per list were studied, and at the same speed 
as list items on shorter lists. Tse and Neely (2005) replicated this effect using more rigorous 
counterbalancing in order to produce a more appropriate baseline reaction time (using the 
Balota et al. (2002) lexicon). Finally, Meade et al. (2006) did not find priming of critical 
lures on a more strict lexical decision task administered immediately after each study list 
except when the lure appeared as the first item on the test.  
Whittlesea (2002) reported the only study to have found significant priming of 
critical lures on lexical decision following study of multiple DRM lists. Whittlesea found 
significant critical lure priming on a lexical decision task but no facilitation on a speeded 
naming task for the same critical lures.  In this case, the lexical decision task was actually 
presented as a conceptual task, when compared with speeded naming which was considered 
to be more perceptual in nature. The result was attributed to the fact that lexical decision 
employs relatively more conceptual processes than speeded naming. Whittlsea used the   73 
discrepancy-attribution hypothesis to explain the false memory effect as a misattribution of 
the surprising clash between fluency in one domain (conceptual) and lack of fluency in 
another (perceptual) to prior perception. However, Whittlesea used an unconventional 
procedure whereby subjects studied all associates on a list together rather than being shown 
each word individually, so these results cannot be taken as conclusive evidence of critical 
lure priming in lexical decision. So far, evidence seems to suggest that the mechanism 
behind false recognition in the DRM paradigm does not guarantee facilitation on a word 
identification task. 
The studies described above differ in terms of testing procedures and controls for 
explicit contamination. Another detail which has not been kept constant is the encoding 
instruction (intentional/incidental). Hicks and Starns (2005) did systematically manipulate 
encoding instructions and found no effect of intentional versus incidental encoding on 
word-stem completion priming, which was significant for critical lures in both cases. On 
the other hand, McBride et al. (2006) were the only authors to have conducted all their 
experiments with incidental study instructions, and they did not find significant priming of 
critical lures on word-stem completion in test-unaware subjects. It may be that intentional 
encoding instructions could have increased the likelihood of explicit contamination in some 
of the studies cited above and thus inflated any critical lure priming. In sum, the question of 
whether critical lures in the DRM paradigm behave like old or new items on indirect tests 
has not been definitively resolved. Note that the above has been a predominantly empirical 
review, because the theories typically used to explain the false memory effect on direct 
tests (e.g., Miller & Wolford, 1999; Roediger et al, 2001) do not make specific predictions   74 
as to whether a falsely remembered item would generate facilitated performance on an 
indirect test. 
 
5.2 False Memory for Pictorial Stimuli on Indirect Tests 
The studies reviewed above have all used indirect tests to investigate false memories 
for verbal stimuli. As yet, no analogous experiments have been carried out using pictorial 
stimuli. The aim of the experiments presented in Chapter 6 was to extend the research into 
false memory on indirect tests to pictures. In the current procedure, false recognition of 
imagined items may occur because these items are processed more fluently than new items, 
leading participants to misidentify them as studied items. Support for this idea comes from 
studies that manipulated processing fluency at test and found that this fluency was 
misattributed to prior perception (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989). Perceptual priming is one 
behavioural manifestation of such fluency. If perceptual priming is found alongside false 
recognition in the current procedure, this would provide another example of perceptual 
fluency incorrectly attributed to previous perception of an item. The line of enquiry in 
Chapter 6 also resumes that of Experiment 3, which involved a comparison of the 
contributions of perceptual and conceptual imagery processes to the false recognition 
effect. In that experiment, there was no evidence that perceptual processes made a 
significant contribution to the effect. A finding of no perceptual priming of imagined items 
would support this result and strongly suggest that the false recognition effect reported here 
is conceptual in nature. 
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CHAPTER 6: FALSE MEMORY FOR PICTURES ON AN INDIRECT TEST 
 
It is typically found that pictures that have been previously perceived are recognised 
faster than new pictures (Warren & Morton, 1982), so it is expected that in the current 
procedure seen pictures will be recognised significantly faster than new pictures. Of greater 
interest is performance on pictures which had been imagined but not actually perceived. 
The predictions of the TAP framework mentioned in Chapter 5 (Blaxton, 1989) in relation 
to modality change in word priming also apply to a change in form. If priming is a function 
of the match between study and test, then a change in form (in this case, from verbal to 
pictorial) should reduce priming on perceptual implicit tests. While most studies have 
found that a change from verbal stimuli in the study phase to pictorial stimuli in the test 
phase eliminates perceptual priming completely (Hirshman, Snodgrass, Mindes, & Feenan, 
1990; Scarborough, Gerard, & Cortese, 1979; Warren & Morton, 1982; Weldon et al., 
1995), some other studies (Durso & Johnson, 1979; Park & Gabrieli, 1995; Srinivas, 1993) 
have found significant cross-form priming, suggesting that certain ostensibly perceptual 
priming tasks can include a nonperceptual component. In order to test whether the 
imagination manipulation used in the current procedure creates false memories that are 
identifiable on an indirect perceptual priming test, it was first necessary to select a task 
which was, as far as possible, data-driven and unsusceptible to nonperceptual processes. 
 
6.1 Experiment 5 
The selected indirect task was a version of the continuous identification procedure 
(Feustel, Shiffrin, & Salasoo, 1983; Stark & McClelland, 2000) that has been shown to be   76 
highly data-driven when used with verbal stimuli. In Experiment 5, a simplified procedure 
was used in which participants studied a mixed list of pictures and words, and were later 
tested on their memory for pictures both indirectly (with the continuous identification 
procedure) and directly (with the same recognition task as in Experiment 1b). This 
experiment sought to verify that priming on the continuous identification task for pictures 
only results from studying pictures themselves, and not studying their names in the absence 
of imagery instructions.  
Method 
Participants 
Twenty Undergraduate students aged 18-21 (M = 19.6) from University College 
London volunteered to participate in the experiment in return for course credit.  
Materials 
The 110 images used in previous experiments were divided into three groups of 30 
critical items which were rotated through the presentation format conditions 
(seen/word/new), and 20 filler items which appeared in the study phase only. Three 
counterbalancing conditions were required for this. Each 80-item study list consisted of 30 
words and 30 pictures which later appeared in the test, and a further 10 filler items in each 
presentation format. The 90-item test phase consisted of 30 items which had been studied 
as pictures, 30 items which had been studied as words, and 30 new items. Half the items 
appeared in colour and half in black and white in the study and test phases; this factor did 
not play a role in the current experiment but was retained for consistency with the rest of 
the experiments. For the priming test, two versions of a mask were created by randomly   77 
filling a 300 x 300 pixel grid with 36 fragments taken from pictures not shown at test (see 
Figure 6.1). 
         
Figure 6.1: Masks used in the continuous identification task. The two masks were randomly 
alternated between trials and appeared in black and white or colour depending on the 
colour format of the stimulus. 
 
Design  
The experiment was a repeated measures design with item type (seen/word/new) as a 
within-subjects variable, and two dependent measures, proportion judged as old in the 
recognition test and reaction time (RT) to identify pictures in the priming test.  
Procedure 
This experiment consisted of two phases: a study phase in which participants were 
presented with pictures and words, and a test phase in which participants performed 
perceptual identification followed by recognition of pictures on each trial. 
Study Phase. In the study phase, participants were presented with a list of 40 pictures 
and 40 words. Participants were not given any particular encoding instructions; they were   78 
simply asked to watch the picture and word sequence carefully. Picture and word trials 
were interspersed randomly. Picture trials consisted of (a) a blank interval of 1000 msec, 
(b) a fixation cross appearing at the centre of the screen for 1000 msec, (c) the picture 
presented at the centre of the screen for 250 msec, and (d) a blank interval of 1000 msec. 
Word trials consisted of a blank interval of 1000 msec followed by the word presented at 
the centre of the screen for 4000 msec. These timings were used in order to keep 
presentation times of the two item types consistent with those used in all other experiments. 
Test Phase. Following a 5-minute mental arithmetic distractor task, participants were 
given instructions for the test phase. On each trial, participants first identified a picture 
using the continuous identification procedure described below. Following its identification, 
the picture was displayed again and participants made a recognition judgment in their own 
time. Pictures were presented in the same central location as during the study phase. 
Previously encountered pictures appeared in the same colour format as in the study phase, 
while new pictures appeared in black and white or in colour according to counterbalancing 
condition, so that half of the items seen at test were in black and white and half were in 
colour.  
The picture identification sequence used in the test phase was based on the CID 
(continuous identification) procedure employed by Stark and McClelland (2000) and 
originally formulated by Feustel et al. (1983) for use with words. In the present experiment 
the procedure was redesigned for pictures. The instructions stated that this part of the 
experiment was concerned with visual perception and that we were interested in the time it 
took people to accurately identify pictures. Participants were told that on each trial they 
would see a picture presented on the screen for a very brief duration, followed immediately   79 
by a mask. They were told that the picture would then reappear and continue to flash on the 
screen for longer and longer durations, making it appear clearer over time. The task was to 
try to identify the picture as quickly as possible.  As soon as participants could make out 
the picture they were to press ENTER and type in the name of the picture when prompted. 
They were informed that once they pressed ENTER the mask would reappear and they 
would not see that picture again until they had entered a response. Participants were told to 
answer as fast as possible but only to do so once they were confident that they would 
identify the picture correctly. As soon as the ENTER key was pressed, RT measurement 
stopped, and once ENTER was pressed again to complete the response, the recognition 
sequence of the trial initiated. 
The timing of the procedure was programmed using the ExacTicks code for Visual 
Basic. Each trial began with the presentation of one of the two masks (see Figure 6.1) for 
500 msec. The two masks were rotated randomly between stimuli, and always appeared in 
the same colour format as the corresponding stimulus. Following initial presentation of the 
mask, the stimulus was presented for 17 msec (the duration of one screen refresh), and the 
mask followed for 233 msec, making a 250 msec block. This stimulus presentation was 
repeated with the duration of the stimulus increasing by 17 msec on every presentation, 
while total block time remained constant (see Figure 6.2 for a graphic representation of this 
procedure). 
Upon identification of a picture, participants were shown the picture again and asked 
to judge whether it was old or new. This task was identical to the recognition test in 
Experiment 1b: recognition judgments were made on a confidence scale from 1 to 6 where 
1 = very sure new and 6 = very sure old. Participants were specifically instructed to only   80 
use the old response if they had seen the picture itself in the study phase. Unlike in all the 
other experiments presented here, instructions stated that if participants remembered seeing 
the word in the study phase, the correct response to the picture was new. Participants made 
the recognition judgment in their own time while viewing the picture. Before beginning the 
test, participants performed a practice block of seven identification trials, although no 
recognition judgments were required. No feedback was given to participants about their 
performance during the test. 
17ms
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Figure 6.2: Timings of two blocks of the continuous identification procedure. The stimulus 
(tiger) is presented for 17 msec longer, and the mask for 17 msec less, in each successive 
block. 
 
Results 
Test Phase: Recognition 
Recognition responses given on the 6-point scale were collapsed into old responses 
(items given a rating of 4-6) and new responses (ratings of 1-3) and are presented in Figure 
6.3. A within-subjects ANOVA showed a significant effect of item type (seen/word/new)   81 
on recognition, F(1.44, 27.44) = 240.08, MSE = .02, partial ŋ
2 = .93, p < .001 (Mauchly‟s 
test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for this main effect: χ²(2) 
= 8.75, p < .05; the Greenhouse-Geisser correction (ε = .72) was used). The proportion of 
hits to pictures which had appeared in the study phase (M = .86) as well as false alarms to 
pictures which had appeared as words in the study phase (M = .21) were both significantly 
higher than the proportion of false alarms to new pictures (M = .14; t(19) = 17.52, SEM = 
.04, r = .94, p < .001 and t(19) = 3.09, SEM = .02, r = .24, p < .01, respectively). Unlike in 
all the previous experiments reported so far (except Experiment 4, in which criterion was 
zero by definition), participants responded to seen and new items without any bias: the 
criterion in the seen-new comparison (M = –.01) was not significantly different to zero (p > 
.9; see Appendix B). 
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Figure 6.3: Mean proportion of old responses by item type on the direct test in Experiment 
5.   82 
The same pattern of recognition data emerged when only the high confidence 
(confidence level 6, very sure old) responses were analysed separately: a repeated-measures 
ANOVA showed a significant effect of item type, F(1.15, 21.85) = 145.07, MSE = .03, 
partial ŋ
2 = .88, p < .001 (Mauchly‟s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had 
been violated: χ²(2) = 24.19, p < .001; the Greenhouse-Geisser correction (ε = .58) was 
used). High confidence hits to seen items were made at a rate of .68, while high confidence 
false alarms to word items were made at a rate of .07, which was significantly higher than 
the false alarm rate of .04 to new items, t(19) = 2.15, SEM = .02, r = .19, p < .05; only 
seven participants made any high confidence false alarms to new items, while 13 of the 20 
participants made high confidence false alarms to word items. The average confidence of 
old responses was compared between the three conditions for those 10 participants (half of 
the sample) who made at least 4 old responses in each category. A within-subjects ANOVA 
confirmed that confidence levels differed between conditions, F(2, 18) = 25.40, MSE = .09, 
partial ŋ
2 = .74, p < .001. While hits to seen items were made with higher confidence (M = 
5.69) than false alarms to new items (M = 4.78; t(9) = 5.68, SEM = .16, r = 71, p < .001), 
confidence levels did not differ significantly between new item and word item false alarms 
(M = 4.98; t(9) = 1.86, SEM = 0.11, r = .18, p = .10).  
Test Phase: Priming 
Individuals‟ median RTs by item type were used in the analyses. RTs were excluded 
where the response given did not match the object name selected by the experimenter to 
serve as the label for the associated picture, or any of its synonyms. Identification accuracy 
was high (.94) across all conditions; a within-subjects ANOVA indicated that accuracy 
differed between conditions, F(2, 38) = 4.55, MSE = .01, partial ŋ
2 = .19, p < .05.   83 
Participants were more accurate in identifying seen items (.96) than new items (.94; t(19) = 
2.40, SEM = .01, r = .29,  p < .05), and equally accurate in the word (.93) and new 
conditions (p = .25). Of the 1800 trials across all participants, 103 trials were excluded due 
to inaccurate identification. RTs were also excluded on the 7 trials where the RT exceeded 
the length of the CID cycle (3500 msec). Overall, these exclusion criteria resulted in a loss 
of 6.1% of the data. Figure 6.4 shows median RTs in milliseconds by item type. Priming is 
defined by a decrease in RT compared to baseline performance on new items.  
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Figure 6.4: Median perceptual identification RTs by item type on the indirect test in 
Experiment 5. 
 
Item type (seen/word/new) had a significant effect on RTs, F(2, 38) = 11.38, MSE = 
10,087, partial ŋ
2 = .38, p < .001. However, while priming of seen items was significant, 
t(19) = 4.13, SEM = 33, r = .19,  p < .01, there was no significant priming of pictures which 
had appeared as words in the study phase (t < 1)
 3. Furthermore, only 9/20 participants 
showed the effect in the required direction (i.e., they were on average faster in responding   84 
to studied word items than new items, allowing for 17 msec measurement error, the 
equivalent of one screen refresh). A paired-samples t test confirmed that priming differed 
significantly between the studied picture and studied word conditions, t(19) = 3.84, SEM = 
33, r = .41, p < .001 (see Appendix C for a summary of recognition and priming results for 
Experiments 5–7). 
Discussion 
In this experiment, pictures that had been studied were correctly recognised at a high 
rate in the direct test and were also identified faster than new pictures on the indirect test. 
Participants also made more false alarms to pictures that had appeared in the study phase as 
words than to new pictures. However, pictures that had appeared in the study phase as 
words were identified no faster on the indirect test than were new pictures. This provides 
evidence that the continuous identification task when applied to pictures is sensitive to 
variations in visual features between study and test, shows no detectable cross-form 
priming, and hence is perceptually driven (Jacoby & Hayman, 1987). 
In Experiments 6 and7, false memories created by the imagination manipulation used 
in previous experiments were tested with this indirect task. Imagining a picture may have 
an equivalent (if lower) effect on perceptual processing to actually seeing one. McDermott 
and Roediger (1994) found that imagery boosted word to picture priming on a test of 
perceptual identification of recoverable picture fragments, although once again a pure list 
design was used. Therefore, priming of imagined items might occur in our experiment if 
the process of imagining an item has an effect similar to that of perception. Alternatively, 
priming for these pictures may arise from prior presentation of their word label due to 
nonperceptual processes as found by Park and Gabrieli (1995).    85 
Whether participants show priming after imagination will depend to some extent on 
the perceptual overlap between the images they create and the test stimuli. Biederman‟s 
(1987) recognition-by-components theory proposes that priming relies on the overlap of 
geometric components (geons) between study and test. According to this theory, perceptual 
priming will be preserved despite differences between study and test stimuli, as long as 
these changes do not affect the structure of the objects (Biederman & Cooper, 1991a). 
Manipulations of object size (Biederman & Cooper, 1992) and viewing angle (Biederman 
& Gerhardstein, 1993) have confirmed that this is the case. More relevant to our research, 
Bartram (1974) and Biederman and Cooper (1991b) showed that naming an object 
facilitates naming another object (or token) corresponding to the same label (or type), 
though to a lesser extent than naming the same object. A representation created through 
imagery can be seen as another token of the type embodied by the associated object label. 
The few studies that have looked specifically at whether imagery can lead to perceptual 
priming have produced mixed results. McDermott and Roediger (1994) found priming in a 
perceptual task which involved the identification of pictures from fragments presented for 
100 msec and 200 msec following imagination of these pictures from their word labels. 
Michelon and Koenig (2002, Experiment 2), on the other hand, only found significant 
priming on an object identification task after perception and not after imagery.  
These experiments investigate whether false recognition of pictures could in part be 
attributed to perceptual overlap between the test stimulus and a representation that has been 
formed as a result of an experience other than perception. If this were case, we would 
expect participants to show both false recognition and perceptual priming of imagined 
items.   86 
 
6.2 Experiment 6 
In this experiment, false memory was induced using the same imagination inflation 
procedure as in Experiments 1a, 1b, 2, and 4, and tested with the combined continuous 
identification and recognition procedure employed in Experiment 5. 
Method 
Participants 
Fifty-one Undergraduate students from University College London  (6 males) 18-29 
years of age (M = 18.8) participated in the experiment as part of a course requirement. 
Design 
With respect to manipulated variables, the experiment was identical to Experiment 5: 
A repeated measures design was used with item type (seen/imagined/new) as a within-
subjects variable, and two dependent measures, proportion judged as old in the recognition 
test and RT to identify pictures in the priming test. 
Procedure 
The study and imagery phases were similar to those of previous experiments: in the 
study phase, participants labelled pictures of objects, while in the imagery phase, they 
studied the objects‟ names and tried to recall whether the associated objects had appeared 
in black and white or colour in the study phase. The imagery task was the one used in 
experiments 1a, 1b, 2, and 4. As in previous experiments, ten of the object names were 
replaced with the ten critical imagined items. The number of items in each phase 
corresponded to that in Experiment 1-3. The number of times participants encountered the 
critical imagined items was consistent with Experiments 3 and 4, in which participants   87 
encountered the imagined items until the imagery phase, where they encountered them 
once only. This was done in order to be sure that the false recognition and any potential 
priming effect were a result of this one interaction with the imagined items. The test phase 
of the present experiment was identical to that of Experiment 5: Participants identified a 
briefly flashing picture on each trial and then indicated whether this pictures was old (i.e., 
whether they had seen the picture in the study phase) or new on a confidence scale from 1 
to 6 where 1 = very sure new and 6 = very sure old. As in previous experiments, 
participants were instructed specifically to use the old response only when they had seen 
the picture itself earlier in the experiment. 
Results 
Study and Imagery Phases 
Performance in the study phase ranged from 88.9% to 100% correct identification of 
pictures from a choice of two labels, with a mean score of 97.5%. In other words, over half 
the participants made less than 3 identification errors in the 90 trials, and no-one made 
more than 10 errors. Performance in the imagery phase was based on the 80 items which 
had appeared in the study phase; the 10 imagined items were excluded from the analysis as 
there was no correct response possible. In this task, participants had to indicate whether 
they had seen each picture in black and white or in colour in the study phase. Scores ranged 
from 52.5% to 83.8%, with a mean score of 65.7% (SD = 8.2), which was significantly 
different from the chance level of 50%, t(50) = 13.61, p < .001. On the 1 to 5 confidence 
scale, participants were significantly more confident on their answers to the 80 items they 
had actually seen as pictures (M = 3.41) than to the 10 imagined items for which there was 
no correct response because these items had not in fact been seen, (M = 2.00; t(50) = 12.81,   88 
SEM = .11, r = .67, p < .001). As in previous experiments, performance on this task was 
consistently above chance, indicating that participants were paying attention to the task and 
following instructions. 
Test Phase: Recognition 
For simplicity, responses given on the 6-point scale were collapsed into old responses 
(items given a rating of 4–6) and new responses (items rated 1–3). Figure 6.5 shows the 
proportion of old responses to seen, imagined, and new items.  
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Figure 6.5: Mean proportion of old responses by item type on the direct test in Experiments 
6 and 7. 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA showed that there was a significant effect of item type, 
F(1.61, 80.2) = 233.35, MSE = .04, partial ŋ
2 = .82, p < .001 (Mauchly‟s test indicated that 
the assumption of sphericity had been violated for the main effect of the within-subjects 
variable, item type: χ²(2) = 13.9, p < .01; a Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of sphericity was   89 
used to correct degrees of freedom, ε = .80). The likelihood of participants responding old 
to an item was therefore dependent upon its status. The proportion of hits to pictures which 
had appeared in the study phase (M = .80) as well as false alarms to pictures which had 
appeared as words in the imagery phase (M = .32) were both significantly higher than the 
proportion of false alarms to new pictures (M = .06; t(50) = 28.41, SEM = .03, r = .94, p < 
.001 and t(50) = 7.41, SEM = .04, r = .55, p < .001 respectively), and 40 of 51 participants 
showed the latter effect (i.e., their imagined item false alarm rate was at least one item 
higher than their new item false alarm rate). 
For high confidence responses, a repeated-measures ANOVA showed a significant 
effect of item type, F(1.47, 73.47) = 207.87, MSE = .03, partial ŋ
2 = .81, p < .001 
(Mauchly‟s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated: χ²(2) = 21.95, 
p < .001; the Greenhouse-Geisser correction (ε = .74) was used). High confidence hits to 
seen items were made at a rate of .57, while high confidence false alarms to studied word 
items were made at a mean rate of .09, significantly higher than the false alarm rate of .03 
to new items, t(50) = 3.68; SEM = .02, r = .31, p = .001; only 11 participants made any high 
confidence false alarms to new items, while 26 of the 51 participants made high confidence 
false alarms to studied word items. Due to the low number of false alarms to new items, 
average confidence of old responses was compared between the seen and imagined 
conditions only for those 23 participants who made at least 4 old responses in each of the 
two categories. A paired-samples t-test confirmed that hits to seen items were made with 
higher confidence than were false alarms to studied word items (M = 5.60 and M = 4.90 
respectively; t(22) = 9.28, SEM = .08, r = .61, p < .001). As in Experiments 1a and 1b, the   90 
criterion in the seen-new comparison, (M = .25), was significantly stricter than zero, t(50) = 
5.45, p < .001
1 (see Appendix B). 
Test Phase: Priming 
The same exclusion criteria were applied to RTs as those used in Experiment 5. 
Identification accuracy was high (.95) and did not differ between conditions (p > .4). Of the 
1530 trials across all participants, 70 trials were excluded due to inaccurate identification, 
and 5 trials were excluded because the RT exceeded the length of the CID cycle (3500 
msec). Overall, these exclusion criteria resulted in a loss of 4.9% of the data. Figure 6.6 
shows median RTs in milliseconds by item type.  
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Figure 6.6: Median perceptual identification RTs by item type on the indirect test in 
Experiments 6 and 7. 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA performed on seen/imagined/new RTs produced a 
significant effect of the within-subjects variable, item type, on perceptual identification,   91 
F(2, 100) = 9.12, MSE = 17,977, partial ŋ
2 = .15, p < .001. Thus, RTs were dependent 
upon the item‟s status. Planned comparisons revealed that while seen items were 
recognised significantly faster than new items, t(50) = 3.03, SEM = 25, r = .16, p < .01, 
there was no significant difference in RTs between imagined and new items, t(50) = –1.18, 
SEM = 29, r = –.07, p = .21
4. In fact, the numerical difference was in the opposite direction 
to that predicted, and only 20 of the 51 participants showed the pattern of results that would 
be indicative of priming (as in Experiment 5, the criterion was a minimum difference in 
RTs of 17 msec). A paired-samples t test confirmed that priming differed significantly 
between the seen and imagined conditions, t(50) = 4.26, SEM = 26, r = .28, p < .001 (see 
Appendix C).  
Discussion 
This experiment, unlike Experiment 5, included a false memory induction with an 
imagery component. As this component increases false alarms to pictures that are 
encountered in word form, we might have predicted that it would also lead to priming of 
these items on the perceptual identification test. However, no such priming was found. The 
absence of priming for pictures of imagined objects on a perceptual identification task is in 
line with the Michelon and Koenig (2002) finding of no perceptual priming following 
imagination, the Hicks and Starns (2005) finding of no priming for critical lures in the 
DRM paradigm on a verbal perceptual identification task, and the studies that found no 
priming for critical lures on a lexical decision task (McKone, 2004; Zeelenberg & Pecher, 
2002). The findings are also in line with studies which have found no cross-form priming 
from words to pictures (Hirshman et al., 1990; Warren & Morton, 1982; Weldon et al., 
1995). However, results of Experiment 6 contradict McDermott and Roediger (1994) who   92 
found priming in a perceptual task which involved the identification of pictures from 
fragments presented for 100/200ms following imagination of these pictures from their word 
labels. 
 
6.3 Experiment 7 
It is possible that the priming effect is weaker than the false recognition because 
priming responses are intrinsically noisier than direct measures (Buchner & Brandt, 2003; 
Berry, Henson, & Shanks, 2006). In order to test this possibility, it was necessary to use a 
false memory manipulation that produced an even higher level of false recognition. Goff 
and Roediger (1998) examined false recognition of imagined actions and found that 
increasing the number of times participants imagined performing an action lead to an 
increased tendency to report having performed the action. Following this rationale, higher 
levels of false recognition are expected in the procedure employed in Experiments 1 and 2, 
where participants were exposed to imagined items in the study phase as well as the 
imagery phase compared with that in Experiments 3 and 4 where they encountered them 
once in the imagery phase. This stronger false memory induction procedure was used in the 
present experiment in an attempt to create optimal conditions for detecting a priming effect.  
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four volunteers (8 males) 18–43 years of age (M = 23.0 years) were recruited 
from within University College London to participate in the experiment and were 
reimbursed for their time.  
Procedure   93 
The procedure was almost identical to that of Experiment 6, except for the number of 
times participants encountered the critical imagined items. This was increased from once in 
Experiment 6 (in the imagery phase only) to four times in the current experiment (once in 
the imagery phase and three times in the study phase) as incorrect options on the labelling 
task to match Experiments 1 and 2. The imagery phase was identical to that of Experiment 
6. Finally, the test phase was also identical to that of Experiment 6, except that on the direct 
test participants had to simply indicate whether a picture was old or new instead of making 
a 1–6 confidence rating. 
Results 
Study and Imagery Phases  
In the study phase, participants identified images from a choice of two words with a 
mean correct score of 97.0% (SD = 4.65). Performance in the imagery phase, where 
participants reported the colour format of pictures seen in the study phase, ranged from 
55.0% to 83.4%, with a mean score of 66.7% (SD = 8.9), which was significantly above the 
chance level of 50%, t(23) = 9.16, p < .001. As in Experiment 6, in the imagery phase 
participants were significantly more confident on the 5-point scale in their answers to the 
80 pictures from the study phase (M = 3.56) than to the 10 imagined items (M = 2.59; t(23) 
= 7.01, SEM = .14, r = .59, p < .001). In a between-experiment comparison of Experiments 
6 and 7, while participants were equally confident in their answers to items from the study 
phase (p = .39), participants in the current experiment were more confident in their answers 
to the imagined items, t(73) = 2.99, SEM = .20, r = .35, p < .01. This difference can be 
attributed to the fact that participants in the current experiment had previously encountered 
these novel items as words in the study phase. Aside from this, there were no significant   94 
differences in performance in any of the above measures between Experiment 7 and 
Experiment 6. 
Test Phase: Recognition  
Figure 6.5 shows the proportion of old responses to the three item types. A repeated 
measures ANOVA showed that there was a significant effect of item type, F(1.58, 36.3) = 
166.01, MSE = .03, partial ŋ
2 = .88, p < .001 (Mauchly‟s test indicated that the assumption 
of sphericity had been violated for the main effect of the within-subjects variable, item 
type: χ²(2) = 6.85, p < .05; a Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of sphericity was used to correct 
degrees of freedom, ε = .79). The proportion of hits to pictures which had appeared in the 
study phase (M = .88) as well as false alarms to pictures which had appeared as words in 
the study and imagery phases (M = .60) were both significantly higher than the proportion 
of false alarms to new pictures (M = .12; t(23) = 22.82, SEM = .03, r = .95, p < .001 and 
t(23) = 12.15, SEM = .04, r = .78, p < .001 respectively), and all 24 participants showed the 
latter effect. Unlike in Experiment 6, participants responded to seen and new items without 
any bias: the criterion in the seen-new comparison, (M = –.00), was not significantly 
different to zero (p > .9; see Appendix B). Participants did not differ in bias between 
Experiments 5 and the current experiment (p > .7). 
Test Phase: Priming 
Individuals‟ median RTs by item type were analysed with the same exclusion criteria 
as in Experiments 5 and 6. Identification accuracy was very high (.97) and did not differ 
between conditions; of the 720 trials across all participants, 30 trials (4.2%) were excluded 
due to inaccurate identification. Figure 6.6 shows median RTs in milliseconds by item type. 
A repeated measures ANOVA performed on seen/imagined/new item RTs produced a   95 
significant effect of the within-subjects variable, item type, F(2, 46) = 7.16, MSE = 17,660, 
partial ŋ
2 = .24, p < .01. Planned comparisons revealed that while seen items were 
recognised significantly faster than new items, t(23) = 3.08, SEM = 40, r = .23, p < .01, 
with 21 of 24 participants showing the effect, there was no significant difference in RTs 
between imagined and new items (t < 1)
5; once again, the numerical effect was in the 
opposite direction to that expected if performance on the indirect test mirrored that of the 
direct test, and only 11 of 24 participants showed the effect. A paired-samples t test 
confirmed that priming differed significantly between the seen and imagined conditions, 
t(23) = 4.03, SEM = 32, r = .30, p < .001 (see Appendix C). 
Discussion 
The current experiment yielded both the highest rate of false recognition of imagined 
items (.60, almost double the next highest rate of .37 achieved in Experiment 1b) and the 
highest corrected false recognition rate (.48, compared with .31 in Experiment 1b) of all 
experiments reported in the thesis. Three factors may have contributed to the effect. Firstly, 
as in Experiments 1 and 2, but unlike in Experiments 3, 4, and 6, participants encountered 
the imagined items four times. As in Goff and Roediger‟s (1998) imagination inflation 
study, this increased the tendency to confuse imagination with perception. Secondly, the 
current experiment was the only one in which the recognition test involved a simple 
old/new judgment. According to the dual-process theory (e.g., Yonelinas, 1994), familiarity 
and recollection processes differentially affect memory performance. A more 
straightforward task such as old/new recognition (when compared with having to make 
judgments on a confidence scale) may have allowed participants to make quicker responses 
and thus rely more on familiarity than recollection. This would be expected to both relax   96 
the response criterion because all items came from familiar categories, and increase false 
alarms to imagined pictures specifically. Finally, Experiments 6 and 7 differed from other 
experiments in that each recognition trial was preceded by perceptual identification. The 
revelation effect (Watkins & Peynircioglu, 1990) describes the finding that viewing a 
slowly revealing item at test leads to an increased tendency to call that item „old‟. It has 
generally been found that the effect is greater for new relative to old items (e.g. Westerman 
& Greene, 1996), suggesting that the revelation manipulation affects memory sensitivity 
and leads to a decrease in accuracy. Although it is not clear what effect such a manipulation 
would have on previously imagined items, the perceptual identification component is likely 
to have led to participants adopting a more relaxed response criterion in Experiments 6 and 
7. Indeed, participants in Experiment 7 performed the recognition task with the least strict 
criterion when compared with all other experiments using a similar procedure (except for 
Experiments 4 and 5). 
While the changes made from Experiment 6 and Experiment 7 almost doubled both 
the absolute and corrected false recognition rates, there was no analogous effect on priming 
of imagined items. As in Experiment 6, these items were recognised no faster than new 
items.  
 
6.4 Discussion of Experiments 5–7 
In Experiments 5-7, we showed a consistent false memory effect for studied word 
items in the direct test and a consistent lack of priming of these items on the perceptual 
identification test. Figure 6.3 shows that while hits to studied picture items and false alarms 
to new items remained stable between the three experiments, the false alarm rate to studied   97 
word items depended on the procedure and, consistent with Goff and Roediger‟s (1998) 
imagination inflation study, was highest when participants were asked to imagine items 
four times. This false alarm rate was always significantly above that of new items. Figure 
6.4, on the other hand, shows that the procedure did not affect how fast studied word items 
were identified relative to new items; seen items were always identified significantly faster 
than new items, while imagined items were identified at roughly the same speed as new 
items. Note that participants performed the identification task at different speeds in the 
three experiments. Experiment 5 yielded the fastest overall RTs, and this is most probably a 
result of participants speeding up across the 90 items in the test phase; in Experiments 6 
and 7 the test phase consisted of only 40 items consistent with all previous experiments in 
the series with the exception of Experiment 4. Participants also performed the task faster in 
Experiment 7 than in Experiment 6, and this could be because the recognition decision 
made on each trial (old/new as opposed to a 1–6 confidence judgment) required less time 
and effort and thus interfered less with the identification task. The important result, 
however, is that despite these variations in speed, the pattern of RTs was consistent across 
all three experiments. Appendix C presents a comparison of performance on the direct and 
indirect tests in Experiments 5–7. It is clear from these data that while false recognition of 
studied word items increased with imagery instructions, no manipulation produced any 
perceptual priming of these items.  
The lack of priming for studied word items on the perceptual identification task in 
Experiments 6 and 7 suggests that there is little perceptual overlap between the 
representations of falsely recognised pictures and the actual stimuli in the current 
procedure. Nonetheless, false recognition of these items is high following one imagination   98 
event (Experiment 6; see also Experiments 3 and 4) and even higher following multiple 
imagination events (Experiment 7; see also Experiments 1a, 1b, 2, and 4). Of course, we 
cannot be certain that participants did in fact follow instructions to imagine objects. 
However, the imagery task fulfilled its function of inflating the false alarm rate on the 
direct test by increasing participants‟ interaction with visual representations of the objects; 
whatever the specific mental processes participants engage in during imagery, the 
conclusion that false recognition on the direct task is largely unaccompanied by perceptual 
priming remains unaffected. On the other hand, the pattern of results does not preclude the 
possibility that participants do create perceptually rich representations during imagery, but 
does suggest that something other than perceptual overlap between internal representations 
and test stimuli must be driving the false memory effect. In fact, any mismatch between the 
two ought to make it easier for participants to reject unstudied items. If this were the case, 
then we would expect a lower rate of false recognition when objects were imagined 
multiple times, strengthening the internal representations and making more salient any 
differences between them and the presented pictures. Instead, we see an increase in the 
false alarm rate, suggesting that nonperceptual processes are responsible for the effect. 
McKone (2004) has suggested that perceptual indirect tests can help distinguish 
between true and false memories; more specifically, priming on indirect memory tests that 
are thought to be driven largely by perceptual processing should only occur for items that 
are actually studied. Experiments 5–7 add further support to such a view: priming on a 
perceptual identification test was only found for pictures that were actually studied, but not 
for pictures that had appeared in word form (Experiment 5), nor for pictures that were 
imagined once (Experiment 6) or imagined multiple times (Experiment 7). This absence of   99 
priming was contrasted with the presence of an increasingly large false recognition effect. 
This suggests that the representations of the falsely recognised items are dissimilar in 
nature to those of truly perceived items. Such an interpretation stems from the view that the 
direct and indirect tests tap a common memory representation. Of course, another 
possibility is that they are based on distinct memory systems (Squire, 1994). 
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CHAPTER 7  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This thesis makes three contributions, two of which are methodological. First, a 
new false memory induction procedure was developed which elicits high levels of false 
recognition of pictorial stimuli on three different direct memory tests: recognition 
(Experiments 1a and 1b), source monitoring (Experiments 2 and 3), and two-alternative 
forced choice (Experiment 4). Second, false memory for pictorial stimuli was examined on 
an indirect test (Experiments 5-7), a technique previously only employed with word 
stimuli. Finally, these methodological advances were applied to a theoretical question: 
specifying whether false memories which arise from imagination are predominantly 
perceptual or conceptual in nature. 
 
7.1 False Memory for Pictures on Direct Tests 
Experiments 1a and 1b demonstrated the basic procedure employed throughout the 
thesis, which involved three phases: a study phase where participants were presented with 
pictures in a labelling task, an imagery phase where they studied object names and were 
asked to think back to the pictures representing these objects, and a test phase where they 
were presented with pictures of studied objects, pictures of objects whose names had been 
studied, and new pictures from the same semantic categories. In these first two 
experiments, the test involved indicating whether each picture had appeared in an earlier 
part of the experiment. In both experiments, participants consistently made more false 
alarms to pictures whose names had been studied compared with new pictures. This was a 
robust effect which occurred in 51 of the 60 participants who took part in those initial   101 
studies. Although these experiments alone are striking in that they show higher levels of 
corrected false recognition of pictures than any other immediate test conditions in the 
literature, further experiments confirmed that this effect persisted under a variety of testing 
conditions.  
One issue of note is that the false memory induction involved a mild form of 
deception: the imagery instructions stated that all items in the imagery phase had appeared 
as pictures in the study phase. It is possible that participants could have been aware of the 
false memory manipulation. In other words, they may have noticed that the some items in 
the imagery phase had not actually appeared as pictures in the study phase. Awareness of 
the deception could lead to two opposing influences on the final test: either, participants 
could be less likely to falsely recognize a new item because they would be able to reject 
any items they had encountered in the imagery phase that they could not remember 
studying in pictorial form; or, participants may be more likely to make false alarms to 
imagined items in order to conform with experimenter expectations. Unfortunately, the 
procedure did not involve a measure to assess this awareness; i.e., participants were not 
systematically asked whether they had noticed any items in the imagery phase that had not 
also appeared in the study phase. However, informally, only a very few participants 
mentioned that they were unsure of whether they had actually seen pictures of all of the 
items in the imagery phase, and those who did were very unconfident in this assertion. 
Furthermore, in Experiments 2 and 3 participants were explicitly told that some items had 
only appeared in word form, so that participants could demonstrate any awareness of the 
manipulation.   102 
In Experiments 1a and 1b, participants were instructed only to respond „old‟ to 
pictures that they had actually seen in the study phase. In Experiment 2, on the other hand, 
participants were additionally instructed to classify pictures that they had only imagined 
into a separate „imagined only‟ category. It could be argued that Experiments 1a and 1b 
masked any knowledge participants might have had about the true source of imagined 
pictures, and that given a response option that directly matched this source, they would be 
able to use it accurately. However, even with this additional response option, participants 
still indicated that they had actually seen more of the imagined pictures than the new 
pictures. This finding concurs with previous studies showing that imagination leads to an 
increased likelihood to claim that a picture had been studied (e.g., Henkel & Franklin, 
1998), and, crucially, extends the effect to a test in which the pictures themselves are 
presented as memory probes. Experiment 3 replicated this effect with a manipulation that 
shed light on the theoretical question regarding the locus of these false memories, which is 
discussed below (see Section 7.3, p. 106).  
Whilst the false memory effect remained in the source experiments, it was 
significantly reduced. An attributional account can explain this reduction. Hoffman (1997) 
showed that when people make false alarms, these are most often attributed to the memory 
source that is judged to be the weakest. While perception is deemed to be a weaker source 
than imagination for words (Hoffman, 1997, Experiment 1; “I don‟t remember imagining 
it, so it had to be you”), for pictures imagination is deemed to be a weaker source than 
perception (Hoffman, 1997, Experiment 2: “I don‟t remember seeing it, so it had to be 
me”). In the current procedure, if a previously imagined picture feels slightly familiar, 
participants may correctly classify it as imagined instead of perceived and imagined not   103 
because they have accurate source memory, but because that is the weaker of the two 
potential memory sources. Thus, using strength as a basis for source judgments, pictures 
that evoke stronger memories would be judged as perceived and imagined, whereas 
pictures that invoke weaker memories would be judged as imagined.  
When hit and false alarm data from recognition tests are presented in the context of 
false memory research, it is often implied if not overtly stated that in a situation where the 
false alarm rate is high, participants might be unsure which of two items had been studied if 
they were presented with one old and one new item. Alternatively, an „old‟ response to a 
studied item may be made on different grounds to an „old‟ response to a new item, and 
participants may be aware of using such a strategy. If this is the case, in a situation where 
participants were forced to choose between a studied item and a new item, they should have 
no difficulty indicating which item had been studied. Of course, collecting additional data 
such as remember/know and confidence ratings (as was done in Experiments 1a and 1b 
respectively) can shed some light on this issue, but a more definitive method would be to 
pit studied items directly against new items in a forced-choice test. If participants are aware 
of the difference between studied and new items which they call „old‟, they should perform 
this task at ceiling and, more crucially, it should not matter whether a studied item is paired 
with a distractor that typically elicits high rates of false alarms, or a distractor that is easily 
rejected. This prediction is difficult to test in the DRM paradigm because due to the nature 
of the list design, studied and critical items cannot be counterbalanced. This leads to two 
potential confounds: firstly, studied and critical items differ inherently on a variety of 
measures other than whether they are presented to participants at study; and secondly, 
critical items are inherently more similar to studied items than are unrelated items.   104 
Although these issues can be overcome (see McDermott et al., 2009), the procedure 
presented here affords a more straightforward design. In Experiment 4, participants were 
tested on picture pairs in which studied pictures were paired either with a new picture or 
with a picture that had been imagined. Crucially, all items came from the same semantic 
categories and were entirely counterbalanced between conditions, so any inherent inter-
item similarities and differences were controlled for. Previous studies have shown that 
people are very good at this sort of task (Shepard, 1967), and indeed, in the experiment 
reported here participants were almost perfectly accurate in selecting the studied picture 
when the alternative was a new picture. However, in concordance with the higher false 
alarm rate for imagined compared to new pictures in Experiments 1a and 1b, participants in 
Experiment 4 found it harder to correctly identify the studied picture from a pair when the 
distractor had been imagined.  
In the analysis of Experiment 4, the focus was on how likely participants are to 
recognise the seen item as having been studied in the seen-new and seen-imagined pairs, 
and thus correctly select it from the two options. An alternative story could be told about 
the item in each pair that had not been studied. In other words, it is possible that instead of 
looking for the familiar item (or the item with the strongest signal) to make their selection, 
at least in some cases participants may look for an item that jumps out as unfamiliar and 
then select the alternate item in the pair. This explanation does not require there to be any 
memory for seen items: a correct response can be made purely on the basis of being sure 
that the item it is paired with was not studied. The fact that participants chose the imagined 
item more often than the new item on imagined-new trials shows that the imagined items 
were indeed more familiar than new items. Consequently, if participants were to use a   105 
rejection strategy, this would be less successful for seen-imagined than seen-new trials. 
However, such a strategy alone cannot account for the results, as it would predict 
equivalent likelihood of rejection of the new item in seen-new and imagined-new pairs, 
whereas in fact, participants were able to reject the new pair in 96% of seen-new trials and 
only in 72% of imagined-new trials. Hence, the difference in accuracy on seen-imagined 
compared with seen-new pairs is better described by a signal detection account. According 
to this account, decisions are based on the comparison of the signal strength of the two 
items in a pair, and the decreased accuracy on seen-imagined compared with seen-new 
pairs arises from the fact that imagined items exceed seen item in terms of strength more 
often than do new item. 
The procedure proposed in this thesis (and Weinstein & Shanks, 2008) fills the void 
that existed in the field with respect to false memory procedures involving recognition of 
detailed, distinctive pictures. While other procedures (e.g., the DRM paradigm, Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995; the category associates procedure, Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997) have 
dealt with false recognition arising from studying semantically related associates, the 
procedure presented here deals specifically with the effect of interacting with a concept 
(i.e., encountering the name of an object) on recognition memory of pictures. In other 
words, it was designed to demonstrate that encountering an item conceptually (i.e., as a 
word) could lead to this item being incorrectly identified as having been studied even 
though participants were basing their recognition decision on a highly perceptually 
distinctive form (i.e., as a picture). This finding can be readily applied to situations outside 
the laboratory, including legal contexts, where it would have strong implications in terms   106 
of the reliability of recognition memory for physical evidence that had previously been 
alluded to verbally. 
  
7.2 False Memory for Pictures on an Indirect Test 
   Indirect tests have been used to study false memory for verbal stimuli (e.g., 
McDermott, 1997; see Chapter 5), while others have investigated whether priming of 
pictorial stimuli on perceptual indirect tests can arise from imagery alone (e.g., Michelon & 
Koenig, 2002), a hypothesis which is based on the premise that imagery and perception 
share processes (Kosslyn, Thompson, & Alpert, 1997) and potentially even produce 
comparable representations (Farah, Péronnet, Gonon, & Girard, 1988). Experiments 5-7 
bridge the gap between these two fields of investigation that have until now remained 
separate, by applying the indirect test methodology to a false memory procedure involving 
pictorial stimuli.  
In three experiments, there was no priming on a picture perceptual identification 
test following study of the names of the objects depicted in these pictures (Experiment 5), 
nor following visual imagery of these objects performed once (Experiment 6) or four times 
(Experiment 7). Conversely, false alarms to these items on the direct recognition test 
increased with visual imagery instructions, producing a dissociation between the two 
measures. With respect to the extant literature applying indirect perceptual tests to verbal 
stimuli, the above finding is consistent with Hicks and Starns (2005) who found no priming 
of critical items in the DRM paradigm on a similar task involving identification of words. 
Hicks and Starns claimed that no priming was found on this task because it relied more 
heavily on perceptual processes than any other indirect memory task; the identification task   107 
used here is the analogous task for pictorial stimuli, so the same explanation applies. 
Turning to the imagery literature, some previous findings (Cabeza, Burton, Kelly, & 
Akamatsu, 1997; McDermott & Roediger, 1994) may have led to the prediction that 
perceptual priming should occur for imagined items in the current procedure. However, the 
lack of priming is consistent with Michelon and Koenig‟s (2002, Experiment 2) finding of 
no perceptual priming of objects following imagination.  
Looking at Michelon and Koenig‟s (2002) results more closely may help to 
elucidate the discrepancy between studies that have found priming from imagination (e.g., 
McDermott & Roediger, 1994) and the lack of priming reported here. In a between-subjects 
experiment (Michelon & Koenig, Experiment 1a), participants were either presented with 
photographs of objects, or presented with object names and asked to imagine the associated 
picture. Both groups were asked to count the number of parts in their photograph or image. 
At test, both participants were presented with pictures of parts of objects they had studied 
or imagined and parts of new objects for 67 msec each, and asked to identify the object. 
With proportion correct identifications as the dependent measure, participants were better 
at identifying objects from a briefly presented part after studying or imagining whole 
objects compared with new objects. Crucially, when the test phase involved identifying 
objects from briefly presented photographs of the entire object instead of from object parts, 
priming was only found after perception and not after imagination of the object from its 
referent (Michelon & Koenig, Experiment 2). The authors explain this result as arising 
from the top-down processing demanded by the more difficult task of identifying objects 
from their parts as compared with identifying entire objects. The encoding and 
identification tasks used in Experiments 6-7 of are highly similar to those of Michelon and   108 
Koenig‟s Experiment 2, with the exception of list design (pure versus mixed): in both 
cases, participants perceive and/or imagine entire objects and then identify briefly 
presented pictures of entire objects. The results reported here are therefore consistent with 
Michelon and Koenig and could be explained by the low cognitive demands of the 
perceptual identification task. One might thus expect priming of imagined items in the 
current procedure to appear on a more cognitively demanding task. 
 
7.3 Perceptual and Conceptual Processes in False Recognition of Pictures 
Another way of explaining the above results is with reference to the 
perceptual/conceptual dichotomy. One hypothesis is that a memory of an imagined item, 
much like that of a perceived item, contains perceptual features that partially match those 
of the test stimulus. This view is supported by the findings of perceptual priming of 
pictures following imagination described above (e.g., McDermott & Roediger, 1994). The 
opposite hypothesis is that the relevant concept is activated, but no perceptual trace exists. 
Evidence for this view comes from studies which have reported no priming of critical lures 
on perceptual indirect tests (McKone, 2004; Hicks & Starns, 2005), studies which have 
found that participants recall more distinctive, item-specific perceptual details in relation to 
true memories than false memories (e.g., Norman & Schacter, 1997), and neuroimaging 
data indicating that false memories show similar activation to true memories in conceptual 
brain regions but dissimilar activation in perceptual regions (Cabeza, Rao, Wagner, Mayer, 
& Schacter, 2001. 
In the experiments reported here, recognition can be seen as a conceptual task and 
perceptual identification as a data-driven or perceptual task. This distinction is made on the   109 
basis of the finding that changes in perceptual features affect priming but not recognition 
(Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). According to this logic, the absence of priming for imagined 
items would indicate that the underlying memory that leads participants to report having 
perceived a picture when they had actually only studied the associated word is conceptual 
in nature. In other words, there is a memory of having studied a concept, but there is no 
memory of having encoded a picture. A false memory of a non-presented item may also 
contain perceptual features which are different to those of the actual stimuli. This mismatch 
ought to serve as a cue to reject unstudied pictures; in the experiments reported here, 
however, the more times participants encountered object names, the more false alarms they 
made (Experiment 7 compared to Experiment 6), consistent with Goff and Roediger‟s 
(1998) imagination inflation procedure with action events, rendering this explanation 
unlikely. The absence of priming following imagination found in Experiments 6 and 7 
accords nicely with the finding of Experiment 3: when participants were asked to imagine 
sentences in response to word labels (conceptual processing), at test they incorrectly 
claimed to have studied the associated picture as often as when they were asked to imagine 
pictures in response to the word labels (perceptual processing). But the major novel finding 
is that this conceptual activation is sufficient to cause people to misrecognize a distinctive, 
but unseen, picture. 
Jacoby and Whitehouse‟s (1989) classic finding of increased false alarms following 
briefly presented primes points to the idea that people misinterpret perceptual fluency as an 
indication of prior perception. This idea generated the hypothesis that in the current 
procedure, false recognition of imagined items may arise from misattribution of perceptual 
fluency. Experiments 3 and 5-7, however, did not produce any evidence for this hypothesis,   110 
showing, respectively, that false recognition of imagined items was just as likely following 
conceptual imagery as following perceptual imagery, and that it was unaccompanied by 
priming on a perceptual identification task. However, it is possible that the false 
recognition effect reported here is driven by misattribution of fluency that is conceptual in 
nature. 
 
7.4 Future Directions 
  This thesis proposes a new procedure for the rapid induction of high levels of false 
recognition for pictorial stimuli and explores one theoretical question: whether the false 
recognition effect is driven by perceptual processes. Other pertinent questions may also be 
answered by using this procedure: for instance, it could be used to delve further into the 
effects of distinctiveness on memory, an issue which has generated mixed results (see 
Chapter 1, Section 1.5, p. 14). While distinctiveness was not part of the design in the 
experiments reported here, this factor could be investigated by manipulating the typicality 
of items presented at study and at test, and observing whether the probability of falsely 
recognising an imagined item is reduced if the stimulus is an atypical representation of the 
object. Alternatively, some stimuli could be replaced by pictures of the same objects taken 
from a different angle. The effects of these manipulations on false recognition could also be 
compared to performance on the indirect perceptual identification task, which would be 
sensitive to some but not all these perceptual changes (see Discussion of Experiment 5, p. 
86). Further work could also be carried out to determine the exact nature of the activation 
of the imagined items and how that leads to them being falsely recognised. For instance, 
although participants may not recognise the physical properties of a previously imagined   111 
picture any faster than those of a new picture, they may be faster at processing the meaning 
of the picture, just as they would be if they had studied the picture itself, and this fluency 
may be misattributed to prior perception.  
For the last decade, research into false memory has clustered around the DRM 
paradigm. The popularity of this procedure stems from the fact that it is quick, easy to 
replicate, and produces robust levels of false memory. While it has proved to be a very 
useful methodology which has helped answer many questions about associative memory 
illusions, it is limited to answering questions about this particular type of false memory, 
and has seldom been applied to stimuli other than words (see Israel & Schater, 1997, for an 
exception). It is my hope that the procedure presented here, which is as simple to replicate 
and produces similarly impressive levels of false recognition, will take false memory 
research in a new direction, with more emphasis on false recognition of highly distinctive 
non-verbal stimuli. Further research with this procedure could help clarify the similarities 
and differences between true and false memories.    112 
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Appendix A 
List of Items by Category 
 
Animals  Clothes  Electrical Appliances  Fruit / Vegetables  Household Objects 
bear
 a  hat  computer  apple  drill 
cat  shirt  hairdryer  banana  hammer 
dog  shoes  kettle  broccoli  knife 
horse  shorts  toaster  carrot  pan 
lion  socks  tv  lettuce  screwdriver 
tiger   trousers  washing machine  orange  spoon 
camel  bag  camera  aubergine  binoculars 
cow  belt  clock  avocado  bottle 
deer  bow tie  dishwasher  cherry  bowl 
duck  bra  fridge  courgette  candle 
eagle  coat  ipod  grapes  comb 
elephant  dress  iron  kiwi  cup 
flamingo  gloves  lamp  lemon  glasses 
frog  sandals  laptop  nectarine  globe 
giraffe  scarf  microwave  pear  hanger 
kangaroo  skirt  phone  pepper  jug 
peacock  slippers  photocopier  pineapple  lightbulb 
rabbit  suit  printer  potato  pen 
shark  tie  radio  raspberry  rolling pin 
snake  t-shirt  razor  strawberry  scissors 
tortoise  watch  sewing machine  sweetcorn  stapler 
wolf  zip  vacuum  tomato  umbrella 
a Italics denote critical items. 
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Appendix B 
Baseline Bias in all Experiments 
 
  Mean  SEM 
Experiment 1a  0.37  .08 
Experiment 1b  0.30  .07 
Experiment 2     
Recognition 
 
\ 
0.42  .07 
Source Monitoring 
 
0.44  .07 
Experiment 3     
Perceptual  0.40  .06 
Conceptual  0.27  .06 
Experiment 4  [0]  – 
Experiment 5  -0.01  0.10 
Experiment 6  0.25  0.05 
Experiment 7  -0.00  0.07   132 
Appendix C 
Comparison of Direct and Indirect Tests in Experiments 5-7 
 
 
aOn the direct test, true memory represents hits to seen items minus false alarms to new 
items, while false memory represents false alarms to imagined (or word) items minus false 
alarms to new items. 
bOn the indirect test, true memory represents priming of seen items compared to the new 
item baseline, while false memory represents priming of imagined (or word) items 
compared to the new item baseline. 
 
Direct Test:  
Proportion called “old” 
Indirect Test:  
Priming effect (msec) 
Experiment  True Memory
a  False Memory
a  True Memory
b  False Memory
b 
Experiment 5  0.71  0.07  136  10 
Experiment 6  0.74  0.26  75  -37 
Experiment 7  0.76  0.48  123  -6   133 
Footnotes 
1Bias was calculated from hit and false alarm rates rather than the raw confidence 
data due to the low number of high confidence false alarms to new items. 
2This assumption receives further support from the fact that participants claimed to 
guess (i.e., indicated a confidence level of 1, not at all sure) on .10 of all seen-new trials 
and .11 of all seen-imagined trials, both of which were not significantly different to .1, or 1 
out of 10 trials (both ps > .5). 
3The same analysis was also carried out on the subset of word and new items to 
which participants made false alarms. In order to obtain a reliable measure of RT, only the 
nine participants for whom at least 4 false alarm RT observations were available in both the 
word and new item conditions were included in the analysis. Participants were not reliably 
faster at identifying word items (M = 1173 msec) than new items (M = 1196 msec), t < .5. 
4It was not possible to look at the subset of studied word and new items which were 
accompanied by an old response due to the low rate of false alarms to new items. Instead, 
RTs of studied word items were compared to the new item RT baseline. The 20 participants 
for whom at least 4 false alarm RT observations were available in the studied word 
condition were included in the analysis. The effect was non-significant and in the opposite 
direction to that predicted, with studied word items (M = 1552) identified slower than new 
items (M = 1482), t(19)  = –1.60, p = .13. 
 
5As for Experiment 5 false alarms to new items were rare so RTs of studied word 
items were compared to the new item RT baseline. The 18 participants for whom at least 4 
false alarm RT observations were available in the studied word condition were not reliably 
faster at identifying those items (M = 1401 msec) than new items (M = 1420 msec), t < 0.5. 